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
**The principle of teleology in the critic**



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THE  
PRINCIPLE OF TELEOLOGY  
IN  
The Critical Philosophy of Kant

BY  
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ITHACA, N. Y.  
ANDRUS & CHURCH  
1897

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## P R E F A C E.

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This Essay consists of two parts : the first being historical ; the second, expository and critical. In the historical part, an effort has been made to trace the influences and steps which led to the displacement of Aristotle's bipartite division of the fundamental powers of mind by the present generally accepted division into Intellect, Feeling, and Will. It is also shown in Part I that Kant's original plan comprised only the critiques of pure and practical philosophy, and that the third Critique was designed at a later time, to establish *a priori* principles for the newly discovered faculty of Feeling. Finally, it is maintained that Kant combined the Critique of Teleology with the Critique of Taste, and issued them under a common title—the *Critique of Judgment*—because both works center about the notion of purposiveness, or design. Part II is devoted to a consideration of the *Critique of Judgment* as a mediating link between the critiques of pure and practical philosophy ; or, if one is thinking of the content—the inner nature of three Critiques—the object is to consider the principle of teleology, which the *Critique of Judgment* illustrates, as a means of mediating the modes of thought prevailing in the realms of freedom and nature.

The edition of Kant's works by Rosenkranz and Schubert is referred to as R., and Hartenstein's second edition is indicated by the letter H. In the same way references have been made to Max Müller's translation

of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Bernard's translation of the *Critique of Judgment* as M. and B., respectively.

I am, of course, indebted to many authors and books for help and suggestion on particular points, and in most cases I have been able to acknowledge this indebtedness by foot-notes. My obligations to Professor Caird's, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, are, however, so great as to require special acknowledgement. I am also glad to have this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to all the professors under whom I studied while a member of the graduate department of Cornell University. And, in particular, I wish to express my obligations to Professor J. E. Creighton for encouragement and direction in the preparation of this work.

D. R. M.

Ithaca, N. Y., August, 1897.

## PART I.

### HISTORICAL.

#### § I. DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE THREE-FOLD NATURE OF MIND.

The division of the Critical Philosophy into three parts rests upon Kant's recognition of three distinct mental faculties—Intellect, Feeling, and Will. That Kant was aware of the influence of his psychology in determining the main lines or divisions of his investigations, is clearly shown by the following sentences from a letter to Reinhold, 1787: "I am at present engaged in a *Critique of Taste* and have in this way been led to the discovery of another kind of *a priori* principles than I had formerly recognized. *For the faculties of the mind are three*; the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the will. I have discovered *a priori* principles for the first of these in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and for the third, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*; but my search for similar principles for the second seemed at first fruitless."<sup>1</sup> Many passages similar to the extract just quoted from the letter to Reinhold may be found in the *Critique of Judgment*, and also in the treatise *Ueber Philosophie überhaupt*, which was published in 1794. The following from § 3 of the Introduction to the former work is typical: "All the faculties or capacities of the mind can be reduced to three, which cannot be any further derived from one

<sup>1</sup>R. XI. 86. H. VIII. 739 f. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*. II. pp. 406 f.

common ground : The faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire. For the faculty of knowing the Understanding is alone *a priori* legislative by means of natural concepts. For the faculty of desire the Reason is alone *a priori* legislative. We may suppose, therefore, that Judgment which stands midway between Understanding and Reason may contain *a priori* principles for feeling." For each of the three faculties, Intellect, Feeling, and Will, there are, according to Kant's final statement, *a priori* principles of activity ; it is the province of the three Critiques to exhibit and explain those principles. In its completed form, therefore, the Critical Philosophy comprised three works corresponding to the three mental powers enumerated above.

Although it is true that the division of the Critical Philosophy into three parts rests upon the three-fold division of mind, and that each Critique has special reference to one particular faculty, it would be quite mistaken to suppose that Kant consciously set about the critical inquiry, to discover, if possible, *a priori* principles for each of the three mental faculties. We know, on the contrary, that the original plan comprised only a Critique of theoretical philosophy, and a Critique of practical philosophy, corresponding to the faculties of cognition and desire. The proof of this is derived from the famous letter to Herz of 1772. Kant's words there are : "I am planning a work under the title, *The limits of Sensibility and Reason*. The work will consist of two parts, a *theoretical* and a *practical*. The first falls into two sections : first, Phenomenology in general ; and second, the nature and methods of Metaphysics. The second, likewise, falls into two parts : first, the general principles of feeling, of taste and of sensuous desires ; second,



the foundations of morality."<sup>1</sup> It is here distinctly stated that the work contemplated is to consist of a *theoretical* and a *practical* part, and although Kant's plans were greatly changed subsequently, the Critiques of pure and practical reason are clearly foreshadowed in the passage just quoted. But it was not until Kant came to recognize the importance of the feeling life, and finally to coördinate Intellect, Feeling, and Will, that he conceived the plan of writing a third Critique dealing specially with Feeling as the completion of his system. Only after a vast amount of investigation and reflection by himself and his contemporaries upon the emotional experience did Feeling come to be differentiated from Intellect and Will, and not until Feeling had been thus marked off from and coördinated with those faculties did Kant see the necessity of assigning to it also *a priori* principles of activity.<sup>2</sup> It is now proposed to set forth, briefly, the steps and influences by which Kant came to accord Feeling a place beside Intellect and Will.

Before the middle of the 18th century, roughly speaking, Psychologists had recognized only two main mental faculties—Cognition and Desire. To quote Sir William Hamilton: "The feelings were not recognized by any philosophers as the manifestation of any fundamental power. The distinction taken in the Peripatetic School by which the mental modifications were divided into Cognitive or Appetent and the consequent reduction of

<sup>1</sup> H., VIII, 688, f.

<sup>2</sup> Another proof that Kant's plan did not, at first, include a Critique of Taste is found in a note to page 21 of the first edition to the K. d. r. V. In this note Kant discouraged as vain all endeavors to bring the critical judgment of the beautiful to rational principles. At that time he regarded the search for *a priori* principles of feeling as hopeless. In the second edition of the K. d. r. V., the note is changed so as to read, 'Judgments of taste are in their *principal* sources empirical.'

all faculties to the *facultas cognoscendi* and the *facultas appetendi* was the distinction which was long most universally prevalent."<sup>1</sup> Feeling was regarded either as a particular kind of intellectual consciousness, a lower kind of knowledge; or it was confounded with desire or impulse. But during the half century immediately following 1740—a period which is characterized by historians as one of great psychological activity—Feeling came to be regarded as an independent mental function, and was assigned a place along side Intellect and Will. The activity in psychology referred to, doubtless was caused by, or rather was a part of the wave of individualism that swept over Europe in the latter part of the 18th century. The same individualistic movement, the same subjectivism that revolted against custom and authority might naturally be expected to revolt against metaphysic. Interest in theories of the universe, its nature and origin, was overshadowed by enthusiasm for man the individual. The watchword of the age was, "the proper study of mankind is man." Man, his happiness, his welfare present and future, his virtues and vices, strength and foibles, became the center of interest for the illuminationists. It is not surprising, therefore, that a part of this grand movement should find expression in most searching analyses of individual psychical states. There thus sprang up a luxuriant growth of psychological literature. One need only mention the works of Mendelssohn, Sulzer and Tetens in Germany; those of Bonnet, Condillac, DeTracy, Helvetius, and Cabanis among French writers as examples of a literature rich in observations and analyses of the individual psychical states. It was during this period of great psychological interest that Feeling attained a rank equal with Intellect and

<sup>1</sup> Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysic*, Lecture 41.

Will. It was this period that saw the displacement of the bipartite division of mind by the tripartite.

Our effort to trace the steps which led to this change must take account first of the work of Leibnitz. For while there is no disposition on the part of that philosopher to break with the old division, yet the investigations which led to the new classification of the mental powers, and especially to the reflection upon the feeling of beauty and pleasure-pain experience, are directly traceable to the influence of his doctrines. To understand Leibnitz's influence upon subsequent psychology and aesthetics it is necessary to recall a few of the leading doctrines of his philosophy. In the first place, he maintained that the world is composed of an infinite number of harmoniously related parts and that true knowledge consists in accurately mirroring that harmony. In the second place, we may recall Leibnitz's doctrine that there are three stages of clearness with which the mind mirrors the harmony and perfection of the world.<sup>1</sup> Corresponding to the first stage we have *obscure* perceptions as in a dreamless sleep or in a swoon; corresponding to the second stage we have *confused* perceptions as "when one hears the roar of the sea which strikes one when on the shore, but does not perceive that the roar is made up of an infinite number of little noises."<sup>2</sup> We also perceive confusedly when we are unable to see that a given color is

<sup>1</sup> The reader will notice that this account leaves out of view Leibnitz's doctrine of the continuity of all being, the theory that from the lowest monad to the highest there is a gradual increase in clearness of perception. It would be misleading to say that Leibnitz made a sharp line of division between the perceptions denominated obscure, confused, clear and distinct. On the contrary, each class shades off into those near it as dawn into daylight. The words obscure, clear, etc., are used only to mark prominent stages in the scale of perceptual being.

<sup>2</sup> Gerhardt, *Leibnitz's Schriften* v. 47. Duncan's *Trans.*, p. 293.

made by mixing two different colors, *e.g.*, we do not see that green is caused by mixing yellow and blue. The highest stage of perception is the stage of knowledge, or truth, in which the mind faithfully and adequately represents the external world. "The mind beholds ideas as though in perspective. The nearer a picture the clearer the lines; the further away the less clear and less distinct. We have *obscure* ideas when it is not possible to distinguish them from ourselves or from other ideas; *confused* ideas when the elements of the ideas are not distinguishable; *distinct* ideas when it is possible to resolve them into their factors."<sup>1</sup> If the ideas are distinct the mind is said to possess true knowledge, and to accurately mirror the harmony and perfection of the world. But if that perfection and harmony are indistinctly perceived the mind experiences not truth but the feeling of beauty. The pleasure which a product of art causes is the result of an unconscious recognition, a confused perception of the perfection and harmony in the relation of its parts. "Music charms us, although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers and in the reckoning of the beats or vibrations of sounding bodies, which meet at intervals, of which we are *not conscious* and which the soul does not cease to make. The pleasures which sight finds in proportions are of the same nature."<sup>2</sup> The harmony, or perfection, in the relation of musical vibrations, if confusedly apprehended, arouses the feeling of Beauty. If that perfection is distinctly cognised we should experience not beauty but truth. "Beauty and Truth differ only in the fact that perfection is confusedly apprehended in one case, distinctly in the other."<sup>3</sup> Leibnitz, thus, by the conception

<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, *Leibnitz and Baumgarten*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Prin. d. l. Nat.*, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Erdmann, *History of Phil.*, § 238, 2, 3, 4, 5.

of Beauty as the confused apprehension of perfection moulded the character of all aesthetical speculation prior to the appearance of the critical philosophy. The men who developed that branch of philosophy merely elaborated the thought of the master.

Wolff, upon whom the mantle of Leibnitz fell, is important for our purpose mainly because of things he did *not* do, but handed down as problems to his pupil Baumgarten. Following Leibnitz, Wolff distinguished two main forms of mental activity—knowing, (*facultas cognoscendi*) and desiring (*facultas appetendi*). He also adopted Leibnitz's distinction of two forms or stages of cognition: (1) a higher form concerned with clear and distinct ideas including Attention, Understanding and Reason; and, (2) a lower form concerned with confused ideas and comprising Sensation, Imagination, and Memory. Wolff having treated only the higher forms of cognition his pupil, Baumgarten, took up the investigation of the lower forms under the title *Aesthetics*, which he defined as “the science of the lower forms of knowledge.”<sup>1</sup> Wolff, in his logic, had established the science of the correct use of the *higher* forms of mind; Baumgarten wished to complement the logic with a science of the proper use of the *lower* forms of knowledge. Inheriting the Leibnitzian psychology through Wolff, he also inherited the fundamental tenet of the Leibnitzian theory

NOTE.—The use of the term *aesthetics* to designate both the theory of the beautiful and the science of the sensibility will be understood if it is remembered that the experience of the Beautiful depends upon the activity of the senses. The close connection between their activity and the beautiful experience justifies the double use of the word “Aesthetics.” Sense-perception of the perfect produces the experience of the beautiful, perfection-sensed gives pleasure. The fact also that both are for Leibnitz confused knowledge warrants their inclusion under a common title.

<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, *op. cit.* p. 15.

of beauty, viz., that beauty consists in a confused perception of perfection. So far as aesthetics is concerned Baumgarten's work consisted mainly in an effort to determine the subjective and objective conditions of the beautiful, and thereby contributed towards bringing into prominence the feeling life.

It seems proper at this point to consider the claim made by Gottsched, and quoted with approval by Schmidt, that Baumgarten, although adopting and retaining the main features of the Leibnitzian philosophy, clearly anticipated the tripartite division of mind established by Kant.<sup>1</sup> In support of their claim on behalf of Baumgarten they cite the fact that he distinguished clearly the faculty of cognizing anything obscurely and confusedly, or indirectly as the *faculty of lower cognition* from the higher faculty of knowledge which possesses logical clearness and certainty. He assumes, therefore, it is said, for the sensuous idea a special though lower faculty as an independent factor of the human mind, having its own peculiar nature, laws and perfection. It is claimed, moreover, that Baumgarten distinguishes between conceptual truth and material perfection, *i. e.*, sensuous truth—Beauty—and so between logic and aesthetics as belonging to entirely different spheres. This, it is said, is a distinct advance beyond the Wolffian separation of empirical and rational disciplines. In Wolff's scheme the lower and higher faculties differed only in *degree*, while Baumgarten originated the idea of two separate faculties. It is very difficult to judge of the merits of this claim made on behalf of Baumgarten because of the uncertain meaning that attaches to the word 'faculty.' But it is quite probable that Baumgarten meant by 'faculty of lower

<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, *op. cit.* p. 44, f.

cognition' a capacity or power (not very different from Wolff's meaning) of having knowledge of a lower order than that yielded by Reason and Understanding. It is not probable that he thought of making Feeling a faculty distinct from and coördinate with Intellect and Will as was done by Kant and the contemporary psychologists. If this view of the matter is correct, Baumgarten can scarcely be said to have advanced in his psychology beyond his teacher, Wolff.

Baumgarten's aesthetical theories were developed by Meier, a zealous student of the subject who adopted the Wolffian division of cognition into higher and lower (sensuous) forms. Like Baumgarten, Meier regarded beauty as *sensuously* perceived perfection, and therefore, as belonging to the lower form of knowledge. "Die Schönheit ist eine Vollkommenheit, *insofern* sie undeutlich oder sinnlich erkant wird."<sup>1</sup> Meier repeatedly insisted that the *schöne Erkenntniss* must be indistinct, that is, sensuous. An act of the Understanding, he maintained, which analyzes a perceived object into its parts destroys the sensation of beauty; for 'beauty is perfection *confusedly* apprehended'. It is thus seen that Meier's contribution to the science of Aesthetics does not differ from, or carry any further, the work of Baumgarten; his influence upon the psychology of his time consisted in bringing into the foreground the emotional experience.

The next noteworthy name in this connection is that of Sulzer who insisted that the Wolffian division of mind into Intellect and Will implied "an undue disregard of the sensations of the agreeable and disagreeable."<sup>2</sup> To Sulzer, therefore, belongs the credit of first laying special emphasis upon the pleasure-pain experience. In the

<sup>1</sup> Sommers, *Deutsche Psychologie und Aesthetic*, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Erdmann, *op. cit.* § 294. 4.

*Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, 1771, Sulzer coördinates the faculty of sensing, *i. e.*, of being affected in a pleasant or unpleasant manner, with the faculty of cognizing the characteristics of things.<sup>1</sup> In the same work he places the aesthetic sensibility between *thought* and *action*. In explaining methods of inspiring men to noble conduct he points out that one must not only appeal to the Intellect, but must touch the feelings as well. "The Understanding yields nothing but knowledge and in this there is no power of acting. If the truth is to be effective then must it not only be cognized in the form of the Good, but must also be sensed, for only by this means is the active power excited."<sup>2</sup> Here Sulzer approaches very nearly to a definite statement of a tripartite division, and, perhaps, failed to do so only because he was concerned with Aesthetics and not with Psychology.

The examination of the pleasure-pain experience which Sulzer was the first to treat with special care was more thoroughly and exhaustively carried out by Mendelssohn in *Briefe über die Empfindungen*, 1755. In the *Briefe*, Mendelssohn contended against those who would acknowledge only Cognition and Will as fundamental activities, and demanded that Sensibility be put along side those faculties. The sensibility here referred to is the power of sensing the beautiful. In the *Morgenstunden*, Mendelssohn describes the character and indicates the place of the faculty of sensing the Beautiful. His language is, "As a rule one ought to distinguish two mental faculties—the cognitive and the volitional—and place the sensation of pleasure and pain with the faculty of desire. . . . But it seems that the satis-

<sup>1</sup> Dessoir, *Geschichte, d. n. Deutschen Psychologie*, I, p. 269.

<sup>2</sup> Sommers, *op. cit.*, p. 205.



faction one feels in the beauty of Nature and Art is wholly free from inclination or desire ; it can be contemplated with quiet satisfaction. I shall call the faculty of beauty the *Billigungsvermögen*, and thereby distinguish it from cognition of the truth as well as from the desire for the good."<sup>1</sup> That is, Mendelssohn proposes as a substitute for the old division of mind into cognition and desire a division that would include also a faculty of sensing the Beautiful. The new faculty is made to stand between the other two and unites by 'the smallest gradations' their activity. It thus appears that the present commonly accepted division of the mind into Intellect, Feeling, and Will was first stated, though somewhat vaguely, by Mendelssohn.

In 1776, Tetens, a distinguished psychologist of the period, was led to make the same classification of the mental faculties. "I discover," he writes in the *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*, 'three fundamental powers of mind; Feeling, Understanding, and Will. Feeling includes sensitiveness as well as the mere feeling of new changes. The power of ideating and the power of thinking, both belong to the Understanding. The remaining faculty which is coördinated with Feeling and Understanding, and is called Will."<sup>2</sup> Whatever one may say of a certain vagueness in the statement of the three-fold division of the mental faculties by Sulzer, Mendelssohn, and Baumgarten, if that merit is accredited to the last named, there is no mistaking Tetens' language. It is a clear and definite statement of the division which met the approval of Kant and which was established by the might of his authority.

<sup>1</sup> Mendelssohn, *Schriften*, Vol. 2, pp. 294-5. *Morgenstunden*, VII.

<sup>2</sup> Tetens, *Versuche*, Vol. I, p. 625.

The result of the foregoing sketch may be summed up by noting, (1) that the three-fold division of mind owes its existence directly to the widespread activity in the field of aesthetics and to the particular trend, or direction, given that activity by the doctrines of Leibnitz and Wolff, more especially to the Leibnitzian conception that, 'Beauty is perfection confusedly apprehended.' After the work of the writers on aesthetics had brought to the foreground the feeling life, it was but natural that the power or faculty of Feeling should attain a rank coördinate with Intellect and Will.

Contenting ourselves with this somewhat fragmentary historical outline, we have now to inquire (1) when Kant first became interested in the question of the division of the mental faculties, and (2) what influence, if any, each of the investigators mentioned above had upon his reflections upon the subject. The following passage from a work entitled *Untersuchung über die deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologiè und Moral*, published 1763, shows that at that time Kant saw the need of a careful examination of the fundamental mental faculties: "Without an exact knowledge and analysis of the many feelings of the mind, the feelings of the sublime, the beautiful, disgust, etc., the motives of our nature cannot be known. Explanations of pleasure and pain, of desire, nausea and the like have never been furnished because adequate analyses were lacking."<sup>1</sup> In the same treatise Kant distinguished between *cognition* as the faculty of perceiving the *truth* and *feeling* the faculty of sensing the *good*.<sup>2</sup> It is evident from these expressions that at that time, 1763, the problem of the

<sup>1</sup> R. I., 84, f. H. II, 288. The passage is quoted by J. B. Meyer, *Kant's Psychologie*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> It is possible, Meyer thinks, that this distinction was suggested to Kant by Hutcheson's *Theory of the moral sense*.

true division of the faculties was clearly before Kant. Further, an examination of the correspondence compiled by Kant's editors shows that his views experienced numerous changes before he finally settled upon the division into Intellect, Feeling, and Will. Setting aside the needless task of enumerating those changes, we proceed to the second question: What influence had Kant's contemporaries or predecessors upon his reflection on the problem of the proper classification of the fundamental mental powers?

First, the historians agree in the statement that Kant was familiar with the works of Baumgarten and Meier, and used them as his guides in the sphere of aesthetics. These works, it is said,<sup>1</sup> were always before him in preparing and delivering his lectures on that subject. The influence from this source we may suppose, therefore, to have been considerable, for the obvious reason that following the lead of such zealous students of aesthetics naturally would lead to an increased knowledge and sense of the importance of the feeling life. It is highly probable, also, that Kant knew Sulzer's essay in which he had coördinated the faculty of being affected in a pleasant or unpleasant manner with the faculty of Ideas. There is no ground for supposing, however, that Kant could have received more than an impetus to his own reflection from Sulzer's work.

The two men who seem to have exerted the most direct and marked influence upon Kant are Tetens and Mendelssohn. Erdmann makes the positive, but probably not carefully considered statement, that Kant based his assumption of three distinct mental faculties upon the authority of Tetens. Meyer questions this statement, and maintains with good ground that, while Kant

<sup>1</sup> Erdmann, *op. cit.*, § 290, 10, 11.

doubtless was familiar with Tetens' *Versuche*, and the three-fold division which it proposed, he received from it no more than direction and guidance in his own investigations. Kant was not the man to adopt the views of other writers without first carefully scrutinizing their validity. It would be very unlike the Copernican philosopher to adopt a view or theory on the authority of some other man or men.

Mendelssohn, in the opinion of Meyer, influenced Kant's reflections upon this subject much more than Tetens; yet there is ground for supposing that the influence was mutual. In 1776, Mendelssohn placed the faculty of Sensation, by which we sense anything as pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad, etc., between the faculties of cognition and desire. This view clearly does not accord with Kant's final statement of the tripartite division; it differs from it especially in that it confuses the aesthetical and the ethical elements in sensation. In 1785, however, Mendelssohn made a sharp distinction between Sensation, as the faculty of sensing the pleasant and unpleasant, and the desire for and the sensation of the Good. This view approaches that expressed by Kant in the letter written to Reinhold in 1787.<sup>1</sup> But the strongest reason, in the opinion of Meyer, for believing that Mendelssohn was largely influential in bringing Kant to his final position on this question, is the fact that Mendelssohn visited Königsberg in 1777, and, while there, conversed with Kant on philosophical subjects. This circumstance, together with the fact that both had long been interested in the problem of the distribution of the mental powers, leads Meyer to think it highly probable that they exchanged views concerning it. However, as Meyer would admit, it is wholly a mat-

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, *Kant's Psychologie*, p. 61 f.

ter of conjecture, that Kant and Mendelssohn discussed the point referred to; further, it is a matter of conjecture what the result of such a discussion would be, supposing it to have occurred. But the fact that Mendelssohn was deeply interested in explorations and investigations regarding the feeling experience seemed to Meyer to afford ground for supposing that he would not neglect the opportunity of urging upon Kant the importance of that aspect of individual consciousness. We are warranted in thinking, therefore, he maintains, that Kant received from Mendelssohn a new and deeper interest in the feeling life, especially the feeling of beauty, and was thus led to assign this experience to a separate faculty of the mind.

It must be admitted, however, that we cannot exactly determine how much Kant owes to Mendelssohn, or to any other thinker, and how much is due to his own independent reflection; we cannot measure exactly the influence which Kant's contemporaries, or any one of them, had upon his investigations regarding the proper division of the mental powers. The proposed innovation in the division of the fundamental powers of mind was only one of the many psychological novelties with which the air was charged. And Kant, like every great scientific worker, was responsive to the influences of his time, and in turn he influenced the world of thought and action about him. So with reference to the question in hand, we may be sure that Kant's displacement of the bipartite division of the mental powers by the tripartite was the result of his own reflection guided and stimulated by other investigators.

In concluding this section one may repeat that it was not until Kant came to recognise Feeling as an independent mental faculty that the plan of writing a third

Critique occurred to him. 'The *Critique of Pure Reason* established *a priori* principles for the Understanding ; the *Critique of Practical Reason* exhibited the *a priori* principles of Desire. It would seem then, that Feeling, as an independent mental faculty, required a separate set of principles to regulate its activity. This demand was fulfilled in the *Critique of Judgment*, the work which formally completed Kant's critical investigations.

§ 2. CHANGES IN THE FORM AND PROBLEM OF THE  
THIRD CRITIQUE.

We have traced in the preceding section the influences and steps by which Kant came to design a third Critique. We saw how the activity in Aesthetics brought to the foreground the emotional life ; how gradually the feeling experience came to be assigned to a separate power of mind ; also how Kant admitted Feeling to a rank coördinate with Intellect and Will ; and, finally, that he designed the third Critique to establish *a priori* principles of activity for the newly discovered faculty. We have seen, also, (p. 1.) that when Kant wrote to Reinhold, 1787, regarding the forthcoming work, he intended to confine his research to a Critique of Taste—an effort to discover *a priori* principles for judgments of the beautiful. It is easily understood how this phase rather than any other of our feeling experience, *i.e.*, the feeling of beauty, attracted Kant's attention first and induced him to undertake the discovery of *a priori* principles for the activity of feeling—as he had previously done for intellect and will—this is easily understood when we remember that the investigations of the Wolffians—Baumgarten, Meier, and Lambert—and the Illuminationists—Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Sulzer—were concerned mainly with the analysis of the experience of

the beautiful and the effort to discover its objective and subjective conditions. Their labors brought judgments about the beautiful into such clear light that they appeared to Kant to need "rationalizing"; they seemed important enough to justify the attempt to find *a priori* principles for them. In its inception, therefore, the third Critique was to deal only with judgments of Taste, it was to be concerned with the single purpose of rationalizing aesthetical Judgments.

But when the third Critique appeared, it included not only a Critique of Taste (Critique of the aesthetical Judgment), but also the Critique of teleological Judgment dealing with the problem of design in organic nature. Kant's reason for embodying both discussions in the same work may be inferred from certain passages in his writings, and from the general character of the two Treatises. Thus in section 8 of the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* he says: "Purposiveness may be represented in an object given in experience on a merely subjective ground—or it may be represented objectively as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself." Again in the same section: "We can regard natural beauty as the presentation of the concept of the formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and natural purposiveness as the presentation of the concept of real (objective) purposiveness. The former we judge by the faculty of Taste, the latter by the Understanding and Reason. On this is based the division of the *Critique of Judgment* into the Critique of the *aesthetical* and the Critique of *teleological* Judgment." In other words, Nature is subjectively purposive in so far as the contemplation of its various forms arouses the emotion of Beauty; it is really purposive in so far as the objects of nature conform to ideas, or con-

cepts. Objects judged aesthetically are judged with reference to their adaptation to the harmonious functioning of our cognitive faculties. Objects are judged teleologically when their possibility is inexplicable except on the assumption that they are the realization of a plan or idea. The beautiful object displays a certain purposiveness with reference to the faculties of knowledge and their accordant activity; such objects are *subjectively* purposive. Organisms exhibit what Kant calls *objective* purposiveness; they seem to actualize, or embody a concept, or plan. Purposiveness, therefore, is the principle, is fundamental to, is the guide for both aesthetical and teleological Judgments. Both activities proceed according to one and the same rule. Caird's profound observation that "the *Critique of Judgment* is equivalent to a discussion of the validity of the teleological idea,"<sup>1</sup> tersely expresses the same thought, that the central, the most important idea in the *Critique of Judgment*, the idea about which the discussions center, is that of design, or teleology.

If now we turn to the *faculty* which acts in accordance with this principle, we find that both functions (the aesthetical and the teleological) are referred to the *reflective Judgment*, which Kant distinguished from the determinant Judgment by the fact that the latter subsumes the particular under a given universal (rule, law, or principle), while the reflective Judgment endeavors to find a universal for the given particular. The determinant Judgment prescribes laws to nature, the reflective gives a law only to itself and not to nature. Kant distinguishes the two forms of Judgment in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*<sup>2</sup> as follows: "If the

<sup>1</sup> Caird, *Critical Phil. of Kant*, II., p. 415.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 17. H., V, 185. B., 16.



universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the Judgment which subsumes the particular under it is *determinant*. But if only the particular is given for which the universal has to be found, the Judgment is merely *reflective*." The determinant Judgment subsumes under universals furnished by the understanding; the reflective Judgment subsumes under a universal created by itself. The former brings the particular under the universal, transcendental laws of the Understanding—the schematised categories. It brings an infinitude of particulars under the universal *a priori* rules of the Understanding. Kant refers to this form of Judgment in the Introduction to the *K. d. r. V.* as the faculty of subsuming under the rules of the Understanding, *i. e.*, of determining whether anything falls under a given rule or not. The 'anything' is the manifold of sense synthesized by Imagination. The distinguishing mark, then, of the activity of the determinant Judgment is that the general, the universal, under which it subsumes the particular, the manifold of Sense, is *given*. Now according to Kant the activity of the determinant Judgment is all that is required to supply us with a knowledge of nature, to furnish us with an experience which we call objective, to enable us to know nature as an object of possible experience. But this activity alone is inadequate to give us an ordered system of knowledge. "The forms of nature are so manifold, and there are so many modifications of the universal transcendental natural concepts left undetermined by the laws given *a priori* by the Understanding—because these only concern the possibility of nature—(as an object of Sense) that there must be laws for these forms also."<sup>1</sup> That is, the determinant judgment supplies us with a world of natural objects,

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 17. H., V, 186. B., 17.

but these remain disconnected and isolated ; order and system are wanting. Caird thus expresses the imperfection and incompleteness of the product yielded by the activity of the determinant judgment : " An endless variation of the detail of experience was still possible consistently with the determination of its objects and their general relations by the laws of the Understanding. Nay, the objects given might be so manifold, and their similarity so slight, that the effort to subsume them under these laws might altogether fail. In supposing that knowledge is possible, therefore, we are supposing, not only that objects as perceived are confined to the general conditions under which they are known as objects, but that, in their detail they are not *infinitely* varied, but have a certain similarity and continuity through all their difference, which makes it possible for the intellect to get a hold upon them."<sup>1</sup> The activity of the determinant judgment being limited to the subsumption of the synthesized manifold under laws of the Understanding, it is insufficient to yield a *system* of knowledge. We have an objective experience but it lacks order and unity. Hence it is at this stage that the demand for a principle of unity arises ; it is at this point that the function of the reflective Judgment and its unifying principle becomes important.

We have seen that in the case of the determinant Judgment its principle of unification, its universal is furnished by the Understanding ; in the case of the reflective Judgment, however, its principle is self-given and self-imposed. The nature of this latter principle has already been anticipated, the principle, viz., of regarding the variety in the forms and laws of nature as capable of being reduced to an order and unity prearranged by a design-

<sup>1</sup> Caird, *op. cit.*, II, p. 411.

ing Intelligence. "The particular empirical laws in respect of what is in them left undetermined by the universal laws of the Understanding, must be considered in accordance with such unity as they would have if an Understanding (although not our Understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of Nature."<sup>1</sup> We must regard the world as purposive, *i. e.*, it must be represented *as if* an Understanding contained the ground of the unity of its manifold of form and law. Assuming the standpoint of the *reflective* Judgment, we must think the world as an ordered, intelligible cosmos, and not as a confused, unintelligible chaos. To assert that the world is purposive is to assert its intelligibility. Hegel thus expresses the nature and function of Kant's reflective Judgment: "The reflective power of Judgment is invested by Kant with the function of an Intuitive Understanding; *i. e.*, whereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal or abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of being deduced from it, the Intuitive Understanding apprehends the particulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself."<sup>2</sup> We proceed in our reflection upon nature according to the principle that a supreme intelligence has ordered the laws and phenomena of nature with reference to a given end. We employ this notion of design (1) in the process of reducing our knowledge of nature to an ordered system of knowledge, (2) in interpreting organic nature, (3) in explaining the Beautiful in Nature and Art. The reflective Judgment as thus described, is the faculty which employs the

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 18. H., V, 186. B. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Werke*, VI, p. 116. *Encyclopaedie*, § 55. Wallace, *Trans. of Logic*, p. 112.

idea of purposiveness in the realm of the beautiful and in organic nature.

In conclusion, one may repeat in answer to the question, What were Kant's reasons for putting the Critique of aesthetical Judgment and the Critique of teleological Judgment in the same work? first, that both classes of judgment rest upon the same principle:—purposiveness; secondly, that the same faculty, the reflective judgment, is operative in both. The following quotation from the treatise *Über Philosophie überhaupt*, originally designed to form the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, confirms this view: "It is demanded that the Critique of the teleological faculty and that of the aesthetical faculty be united as resting upon the *same principle*."<sup>1</sup> For the teleological as well as the aesthetical judgment belongs to the *reflective* judgment and not the determin-  
nant."<sup>2</sup> This passage, the clearest I have found on the subject, as was stated, is from the treatise which was originally intended to form the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* and fully agrees with the passage quoted (p. 17) from the Introduction to the work as it now stands.

In addition to the reasons already advanced in explanation and justification of the connection of the two works, viz., that both center about the principle of design, and that both come under the dominion of the reflective Judgment, one may suppose that another consideration tended to commend to Kant the plan of combining the two treatises; the fact, namely, that in the course of his reflection he had come to regard the principle of purposiveness as a mediating link between the

<sup>1</sup> The "same principle" referred to, is, of course, the principle of purposiveness, or design.

<sup>2</sup> R., I, 614 f. H., VI, 401.

doctrines of the critiques of pure and practical Reason. Now when purposiveness came to be regarded as a principle of mediation between the doctrines of the former critiques, every discussion and every illustration of that principle, which, as Kant believed, would harmonize the results of the earlier critiques, would be brought together in one work. Every fact and every argument that would contribute toward throwing light upon the teleological notion naturally would be gathered under the same title. Although Kant nowhere intimates that this consideration had any influence whatever in causing him to combine the two discussions, it cannot be wholly fanciful to suppose that after he recognized in the notion of design the key to the unification of the earlier critiques, he naturally would see the propriety of combining a discussion of the design manifest in the beautiful with that of the design thought to be displayed by organic nature. The *Critique of Judgment* had come to be regarded as something more than a completion of the critical system as a number of mechanically related parts; it contained the discussion of a principle which would unite the system into a harmonious whole. We may suppose, therefore, that as the necessity of designing the third critique with reference to the mediation of the former critiques became more urgent, the fitness of uniting the two discussions of teleology in the same work became more apparent. And while it is true that when the third critique was originally planned its problem was limited to a determination of the *a priori* principles of Taste, yet the fact that the key to the experience of the beautiful and to the interpretation of organic nature lies in the notion of purposiveness, and the further fact, that the third critique, as the unfolding and illustration of that notion, is the keystone, the

unifier of the critical system, fully justifies the inclusion of the critiques of the aesthetical and teleological judgment under the same title.

Even if the above is accepted as an explanation and justification for the union of the two treatises under the same title, it is still maintained by Adamson,<sup>1</sup> and, I think rightly, that the Critique of aesthetical Judgment forms one distinct work with principles of its own, and is the peculiar and proper subject of the third Critique. In support of this proposition, the following quotation may be submitted: "The faculty of cognition according to concepts has its *a priori* principles in the pure Understanding (the concepts of Nature), the Will in pure Reason (its concepts of Freedom). There yet remains among the general properties of the mind a mediating faculty or sensibility, viz., the feeling of pleasure and pain; so likewise among the higher cognitive faculties there remains a mediating faculty, the Judgment. Now what is more natural than to suppose that the Judgment contains *a priori* principles for Feeling."<sup>2</sup> After Kant adopted the three-fold division of Mind into Intellect, Feeling, and Will, and after the first two Critiques had established *a priori* principles for the Intellect and Will, the idea of completeness seemed to demand that the discovery of *a priori* principles for Feeling be undertaken. That is, the investigation of the feeling experience, the attempt to determine *a priori* principles for judgments of the beautiful would complete the work so far as criticism was concerned. It was not necessary, it was even beside the task, so far as *completeness* of treatment was concerned, to enter upon the investigation of the purposiveness manifest in organic products which forms the

<sup>1</sup> *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> R., I, p. 587. Quoted by Adamson, *op. cit.* p. 235.

second part of the third Critique as issued. The following passage affords additional proof that Kant regarded the Critique of aesthetical Judgment in particular to be necessary for the completion of his system: "The Critique of Taste, which formerly was for the improvement of Taste, opened, when considered from the transcendental point of view, in that it filled a gap in the system of our faculties of cognition, a remarkable, and it seems to me, a very promising outlook towards a completed system of all the mind's powers so far as they are related in their determination not only to the sensuous but also to the supersensuous."<sup>1</sup>

Stadler, who agrees with Adamson in maintaining that the Critique of the aesthetical Judgment is all that properly belongs to the third Critique, states the object of the investigation in his work, *Kant's Teleologie*,<sup>2</sup> to be "to show that the Critique of the teleological judgment stands in a close and important relation to the *Critique of pure Reason*." That is, Stadler proposes to show that the thought elaborated in the Critique of the teleological Judgment, viz., that in our investigation of organic nature we must proceed upon the supposition that organisms are the result of design is merely a fuller treatment of the doctrine sketched in the *K. d. r. V.* under the heading, *Of the regulative use of the Ideas of pure Reason*.<sup>3</sup> That doctrine, briefly stated, is that in all our investigations we must proceed on the theory that the world has originated in the design of a supreme Intelligence; that purpose, plan, pervades and is revealed in the world of nature. Accordingly, Stadler argues that the union of the two treatises in the same volume, under the same title does not signify their absolute coördination. Two pas-

<sup>1</sup> R., I, p. 615. H., VI, 402.

<sup>2</sup> Stadler. *Kant's Teleologie*, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> R., II, 499. H., III, 435 ff. M., II, 551 ff.

sages, one from the Preface, another from the Introduction to the *K. d. U.*, seem to confirm his position. From the Preface he quotes, "The confusion on account of a principle exists mainly in the aesthetical Judgment, . . . the *most important part* of a Critique of the faculty of Judgment is the critical investigation of Taste."<sup>1</sup> From the Introduction he cites, "the aesthetical Judgment is a particular faculty of judging things according to a rule but not according to concepts; the teleological judgment on the other hand is no particular faculty but only the reflective Judgment in general."<sup>2</sup> Again in stating the problem of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant enumerated three things which he proposed to investigate: (1) "whether Judgment, the mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has *a priori* principles; (2) whether these, if they exist at all, are constitutive or merely regulative; (3) whether they give a rule *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and pain as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire just as the Understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to the first and Reason to the second."<sup>3</sup> If this passage is read with the thought in mind that Kant was aiming in the third Critique to complete his critical investigations, one can hardly resist the conclusion that the discussion which the Critique of the aesthetical Judgment contained was regarded by Kant as more important than the Critique of the teleological Judgment, since it undertakes to determine whether Judgment prescribes rules for Feeling just as Understanding does for Cognition, and Reason for the faculty of Desire. It would seem, therefore, that if the main

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, p. 4. H., V, 175. B., 4.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 37. H., V, 200 f. B., 37.

<sup>3</sup> R., IV, 2. H., V, 174. B., 2.



object of the third Critique was to complete the critical investigation by finding an *a priori* rule for the feeling of pleasure, that that task was completed by the Critique of aesthetical Judgment. It appears, further, that some aim other than that of merely completing his system moved Kant to issue the two treatises under the same cover.

As a supplement to the proposition that the Critique of aesthetical Judgment is all that properly belongs to the third Critique, so far as the demand for architectonic unity is concerned, we derive the corollary that originally Kant regarded the third Critique as effecting merely the *formal*, or external, connection of the earlier Critiques as distinguished from the *real* or inner mediation to be described hereafter. The following passage from the letter written to Reinhold in 1787, supports the conclusion that the thought of *real* or inner mediation had not at that time taken definite shape in Kant's mind, and that the problem and final success of discovering *a priori* principles for all the faculties of mind was then of most importance for him. "I now recognize," he writes, "three parts of Philosophy, *each of which has its own a priori principles*. We can now, therefore, securely determine the compass of knowledge, which is possible in this way, as including the three departments of Theoretical Philosophy, Teleology, and Practical Philosophy."<sup>1</sup> All along it was the thought of establishing *a priori* principles for the mental functions that was of paramount importance. Caird thus touches the secret of the delight which thrilled Kant at the discovery of the key to judgments of Taste: "Kant had begun the critical inquiries in the effort to separate the apparent from the real, the element in our ideas or knowledge

<sup>1</sup> H., VIII, 739, f. Caird, *op. cit.*, II, p. 407.

which is peculiar to us as finite subjects whose reason works through sense, from that element which we apprehend in virtue of pure reason itself." Now the discovery of *a priori* principles for the faculty of feeling, as had been done previously for knowledge and desire, afforded "a fresh confirmation of the truth of his fundamental principles".<sup>1</sup> For if he had failed to find the *a priori* element in the feeling of the beautiful, it would have cast a shadow of doubt over the soundness of the whole critical procedure; but since *a priori* principles have been discovered for this experience, and since we may now securely determine the compass of knowledge according to such principles, we may have increased confidence in the critical procedure, its methods and results. Furthermore, if Kant designed the Critique of Taste to represent a method of uniting the different parts of his philosophy into a real system, or if any such purpose had occurred to him at the time he wrote to Reinhold respecting the forthcoming work, why did he not refer to the fact? It is highly improbable that he would neglect or fail to mention so important a function if it had then occurred to him. Still another thing that seems inexplicable on the theory that the *Critique of Judgment* was written expressly to mediate the opposing results of the earlier works is the fact that nowhere in the discussion of the aesthetical and teleological judgments is there any mention of 'mediation'. It seems incredible that Kant should have planned a work to unite the opposing parts of his system and still make no reference to his purpose in the course of the discussion. One naturally would expect to find an indication of the way in which the principle illustrated is to be applied. The more probable theory is that it was after Kant de-

<sup>1</sup> Caird., *op. cit.*, II, pp. 409, 406.

cided to unite the Critiques of aesthetical and teleological judgment under the same title, because both center about the notion of purposiveness, that it occurred to him that the third Critique would harmonize the results of the Critiques of pure and practical Reason.

It is proper to note at this point that the Stadler-Adamson argument for regarding the Critique of aesthetical Judgment as the proper work of the third Critique lays special emphasis upon the fact that Kant's leading purpose was to complete the system by rationalizing the feeling experience. Starting with this assumption the conclusion is inevitable that the connection of the Critique of the teleological with the Critique of the aesthetical Judgment is more or less forced and unnatural. But when we remember that Kant's final and broader plan included not only the formal completion of the critical investigation, but also proposed to point out a method of harmonizing the results of the former Critiques, the reason for combining both treatises under the same title is quite apparent and entirely adequate.

The conclusion we reach from the foregoing argument is that, in its inception, the Critique of Taste was designed to mediate the preceding Critiques in so far, and only in so far, as there was need of such an investigation to complete the work of criticism: further, that it was not until after the Critique of Taste had been finished, and probably after it had been united with the Critique of Teleology under the title, *Critique of Judgment*, that the work seemed to Kant to afford a principle of real, or inner, mediation between the results of the former Critiques.

## PART II.

### THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT AS A MEDIATING LINK BETWEEN KANT'S THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

#### § 1. FORMAL AND REAL MEDIATION DISTINGUISHED.

In the Preface and Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* the work is described as a mediating link, or as supplying a principle of mediation, between the theoretical and practical philosophy. This description, which is quite brief and incomplete, suggested the main problems of this part of our investigation; namely, what doctrines of the theoretical and practical philosophy require to be mediated? and what meaning can we attach to the expression 'mediation' when applied to the third Critique and the place it occupies in the critical philosophy?

Preliminary to these more important inquiries, it is necessary to distinguish the two ways in which the *Critique of Judgment* may be said to mediate the Critiques of pure and practical philosophy. According to one mode of representation the mediation which the third Critique affords is merely external and *formal*; according to another it is inner and *real*. It will be necessary, in the first place, to make clear the distinction between formal, or external mediation and real, or inner mediation. Kant has reference to *formal* mediation when he says that, "since Judgment stands between Understanding and Reason in the family of the supreme cognitive faculties, and since the two latter faculties have *a priori* principles of legislation, we may judge by

analogy that Judgment also has a special *a priori* principle of legislation."<sup>1</sup> It was maintained in a former section that the primary aim of the third Critique (the Critique of Taste) was to rationalize judgments about the beautiful; incidentally, Kant intended to mediate the work of the earlier Critiques in the sense that has been designated above as *formal*. Thus, in the preface to the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant states his object to be "to determine whether Judgment which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has also *a priori* principles for itself, and whether they give a rule *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and pain as the 'mediating link' between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire (just as the Understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to the first and Reason to the second.)"<sup>2</sup> The first two Critiques had established *a priori* principles for the Intellect and Will, and the idea of completeness demanded that a similar work be performed for the faculty of Feeling which, in Kant's table, stands between Intellect and Will. That is, the investigation of the feeling experience, and the discovery of *a priori* principles for judgments about the beautiful would complete the work so far as criticism was concerned. One more passage may be quoted to illustrate what is meant by formal mediation: "Between Understanding and Reason stands Judgment, of which we have cause for supposing according to analogy that it may contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special principle of its own to be sought according to laws though merely subjective *a priori*. . . . For the faculty of Knowledge the Understanding is alone legislative . . . for the

<sup>1</sup>R. IV, 15. H. III, 183. B. 14.

<sup>2</sup>R. IV, 2. H. III, 174. B. 2.

faculty of desire, Reason is alone *a priori* legislative. Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire there is the feeling of pleasure just as the Judgment mediates between Understanding and Reason. We, therefore, may suppose provisionally that Judgment likewise contains in itself an *a priori* principle."<sup>1</sup>

It is at once apparent that mediation, as described in the foregoing paragraph, is merely external, or formal; that is, the third Critique was designed to mediate between the first two Critiques in the sense that it attempts to discover, exhibit and illustrate the principle or principles underlying the activity of faculties which, in Kant's scheme, occupy a middle ground. Judgment standing *between* Understanding and Reason supplies a principle for feeling which is intermediate to cognition and desire. In this sense, the third Critique fills a gap, and by so doing completes the task of discovering *a priori* principles for each of the so-called supreme cognitive faculties.

Reasons have already been given for believing that when the third Critique was first planned, 'mediation' meant for Kant no more than bridging the gap, in the manner indicated above, left by the Critiques of pure and practical Reason. In other words, the dominating purpose was *not* to find a principle which would unify and harmonize the results of the theoretical and practical philosophy; but it was to discover the *a priori* principle for the faculty of Feeling which recently had been coördinated with Intellect and Will. Kant did not consciously set about to unify, to mediate the opposing results of the two former Critiques; it was rather his task to rationalise the feeling experience. But as the work progressed, as the third Critique became en-

<sup>1</sup> R. IV, 15 f. H. III, 183 f. B. 14 f.

larged so as to embrace not only a Critique of Taste, but also a Critique of teleological Judgment under the title, *Critique of Judgment*, mediation came to have a real and very important meaning for Kant. He began to see that the third Critique not only filled a gap in the critical investigation, but that it also revealed a method of harmonising the apparently contradictory results of the earlier Critiques. It still remains to show—and this is the main purpose of this investigation—what is involved in the notion of ‘real mediation,’ and in what sense the *Critique of Judgment* supplies such a principle.

We have seen that Kant has reference to real mediation when he attributes to Judgment the function of supplying a “principle of mediation between the realm of the concept of nature and that of the concept of freedom.” The same thought is elsewhere stated thus: “The concept of the purposiveness of nature is fit to be a mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom.”<sup>1</sup> Still another way of expressing the notion of real mediation is as follows: “Judgment furnishes a concept that makes possible the transition from conformity to law in accordance with the concept of nature to final purpose in accordance with the concept of freedom.”<sup>2</sup>

Before inquiring at length what real mediation means or involves, it will be necessary to determine what meanings are conveyed by the somewhat vague and indefinite expressions, “realm of the concept of nature”, and “realm of the concept of freedom”. For casual observation shows that they are used to express any one of a number of things; that their meaning varies with the

<sup>1</sup> R. IV, 39; H. III, 203; B. 41.

<sup>2</sup> R. IV, 38; H. III, 202; B. 39.

context. Thus 'realm of nature' is used to distinguish the phenomenal from the noumenal, the sensible from the supersensible, the object known from the knowing subject, consciousness of objects from self-consciousness, the world of nature in strict conformity to physical law from the world of spirit under the dominion of freedom, Understanding and its legislation from Reason and its legislation. The expression 'realm of freedom' is equivalent to the second member of each of this series of pairs. To represent completely what Kant means by each of these expressions—'realm of the natural concept' and 'realm of the concept of freedom'—would involve a statement of the main doctrines and conclusions of the Critiques of pure and practical Reason. For 'realm of the concept of nature' corresponds to the domain in which the principles of the theoretical philosophy are regnant; 'realm of the concept of freedom' corresponds to the sphere in which practical Reason with its legislation is supreme. It will be necessary, therefore, to state and show the mutual relations of the leading doctrines and results of the critiques of theoretical and practical philosophy. For this purpose, however, it will be sufficient to give a very general outline of the elaborate and intricate discussions of the two Critiques, and to indicate the fundamental features and results of each work.

## § 2. RELATION OF THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It is now proposed to represent the relation of the main results of the Critiques of pure and practical Reason in order to indicate more exactly the nature of the opposition, or disharmony, which the *Critique of Judgment* is supposed to overcome. First, with reference to



the results of the *Critique of pure Reason*, it will suffice to state what seem to be its main purpose and results when considered with reference to the main conclusions of the *Critique of practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. Viewing Kant's system as a whole, it may be said that the *Critique of pure Reason* contains a doctrine of knowledge, the *Critique of practical Reason* presents a theory of morals, and the *Critique of Judgment* a doctrine of teleology. The main purpose of the *Critique of pure Reason* is an examination of the mind as an organ of knowledge, and its problem is to indicate the factor or factors which the mind supplies in the complex of experience called the objective world ; it is "a determination of the *a priori* principles of the faculty of cognition with reference to their conditions, extent, and the limits of their use."<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, we have presented, as Kant conceived it, a description of how the known world is built up from sense impressions, the forms of space and time, and the concepts of Understanding. Kant starts with the fact of experience, and exhibits the factors and conditions by which we come to have what we call a knowledge of the world. Thus regarded, the *Critique of pure Reason* is essentially and primarily a presentation of a theory of knowledge. It considers man as a cognitive being, and explains the origin, presuppositions and limits of knowledge.

But this seems to be a partial and inadequate view of man's nature ; it disregards an important side or factor of his life, viz., the volitional side. Man is a being that *wills*, that has purposes, and ideals, and strives to realize them. He not only *knows* but *wills*. Especially is it

<sup>1</sup> R., VIII, 115 ; H., V, 11 f. Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, 4th ed., p. 97.

to be noted that a philosophy which is limited to man's cognitive nature leaves out of account the fact that he is a moral being with moral ends to fulfill. Not only is this mode of representation one-sided and incomplete, but it is seen that if the principles, rules, and axioms which are valid in the phenomenal, material world, are extended and given universal application, they threaten to undermine the foundations of the moral and religious life. This danger exists particularly with reference to the unchecked extension of the principle of causality, according to which every event must have another preceding event as its cause. The law of causality demands that every change shall result from or depend upon an antecedent change. This is the view that we are compelled to take, if we look at the world from the standpoint of cognition; we are bound to follow the category of causality, and, therefore, to regard every phenomenon as determined by a preceding phenomenon. The world then presents the scene of an endless series of events each of which is caused by the one preceding it. The changes which man is thought to effect in the world are no exception to this rule. Man, as a member of the phenomenal world, is subject to its laws, is impelled by its forces, is carried along like a material thing by the irresistible course of events.

Now this manner of extending the use of the notion of causality seemed to Kant to exclude all moral action and to render moral legislation futile. For, as will be remembered, according to Kant's way of conceiving the matter, man's actions, so far as they are incited by influences from the phenomenal world, are non-moral. Man's conduct, so far as it is determined by sensuous motives of pleasure and pain, has no moral worth whatever. Hence, the possibility of morality is dependent

upon the possibility of establishing a ground of activity for man's will free from all sensuous motives. There thus arises the necessity of inquiring whether there is a determination of Will independent of influences from the sensible world. The first and most important task of practical philosophy is, therefore, "to determine whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the Will, or whether it can be a ground of determination only on empirical conditions."<sup>1</sup> The *Critique of Practical Reason* inquires whether man has the power of free self-determination in accordance with moral maxims which are self-derived and self-imposed. Kant is thus seen to have a double purpose in view; viz., to establish freedom, and also to displace the hedonistic ethical doctrines of his time. "To this Eudaemonism which was destitute of stability and consistency, and which left the door and gate wide open for every whim and caprice, Kant opposed the Practical Reason and thus emphasized the need for a principle of Will which should be universal and lay the same obligation on all."<sup>2</sup> The vindication of freedom involved the establishment of principles of legislation for the moral activities of the Will independent of all reference to pleasure-pain motives, and the proof that reason legislates *a priori* for Will is at the same time the proof of freedom.

<sup>1</sup> R., VIII, 119; H., V., 15. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 101.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Werke*, VI, p. 115. Wallace, *Trans. of Logic*, p. 111.

NOTE.—Hegel's use of the word 'Eudaemonismus' to indicate the doctrines against which Kant 'opposed the practical reason' is not altogether happy. The word 'hedonism' describes more accurately the kind of ethical teaching against which Kant was protesting. For the word *εὐδαιμονία* as used by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics included not only the well-being of the sentient-self (Hedonism), but also the well-being of the rational self. For full discussion of the distinction between Hedonism and Eudaemonism, see Professor J. Seth's *Study of Ethical Principles*, Part I.

We shall now have to set forth Kant's method of establishing the postulate of freedom. Briefly put, the ground of the belief in freedom—the *ratio cognoscendi*—is the consciousness of the "ought", the feeling of moral obligation, the sense of duty to which every one feels himself subject. The fact that we feel that we ought to do certain things and refrain from doing others proves that we can. "Thou oughtst, therefore, thou canst." Otherwise, we should not understand the sense of duty which every one experiences; it would be impossible to understand the force and absoluteness of the decrees of practical Reason without supposing that man is free to comply with them. Since conscience issues unconditional commands for the performance of certain actions and forbids the performance of others, we must believe that man is free to obey its dictates. Thus freedom, which had no standing in the theoretical Philosophy, is established for practical Philosophy by the consciousness of duty.

But it is not enough to show that the Will is free to act according to the dictates of self-derived rules, to prove that Reason is the sole determining principle of the moral will; it must be possible for the principles of Reason to find objectivation. "Reason first becomes practical in the true sense of the word when it insists upon the good being manifested in the world with an outward objectivity."<sup>1</sup> That is, when the Will, which recognizes the obligation of the moral law, seeks to give that law objective realization. Kant was not content to confine the legislation of Reason to a mere formal determination of the Will which would leave it unrelated and incapable of being related to the concrete actions of man. Reason must have an object to realize—an object the

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Werke*, VI, p. 115. Wallace, *Trans. of Logic*, p. 110.

realization of which forms for Kant the *summum bonum*.<sup>1</sup> And while Kant would not admit that the need of realizing the highest good can become a ground of determination for the Will—for the basis of that obligation is wholly subjective—yet the *chief good* is the necessary object of a Will practically determined.

But an obstacle to the attainment of the *summum bonum* arises from the fact that man's conduct is not wholly guided by the law of reason; he is a member of the sensible world and, as such, is ever open to influences from that world; and so long as his actions are partially empirically determined he is *ipso facto* incapable of attaining the fundamental element of the chief good—holiness. "The perfect accordance of the Will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence."<sup>2</sup> Kant gets over this difficulty by the thought of a progress *in infinitum* in which there is an increasing harmony between the empirical and rational determinations of will. "It is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the moral law."<sup>3</sup> An endless process of culture and discipline is required to reach a state of holiness. "This endless progress is possible only on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same ra-

<sup>1</sup> Note. The *summum bonum* in Kant's Ethics is the union of perfect virtue and perfect happiness. One who has attained a state of perfect virtue combined with perfect happiness has achieved the highest good. Kant did not dissociate holiness and happiness and regard one as the chief good, the other as a means to that good, as had been the custom of moralists from the beginning of speculation upon the subject of the *summum bonum*. Neither of these factors is the cause or ground of the other, for the notion of the highest good includes both.

<sup>2</sup> R., VIII, 261; H., V, 128. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 218.

<sup>3</sup> R., VIII, p. 262; H., V, 128. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 219.

tional being ( which is called immortality of the soul ). ”<sup>1</sup> Kant thus overcame the difficulty resulting from an antagonism between the sensuous and rational motives to action by supposing that in an infinite series of steps the two kinds of motives will be brought into accord. The possibility of this infinite progress depends upon the continued existence of the soul, immortality.

We saw above ( note p. 39 ) that the moral law leads us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the *summum bonum*, viz., happiness proportioned to virtue. Although happiness is never a motive to virtuous conduct ( for then the conduct would cease to be moral since the sole spring of moral conduct is reverence for the moral law ), it must be conceived as always attending it. But it would be far from the truth to assert that happiness does in all cases accompany virtuous acting ; on the contrary, we observe that very many noble deeds are inevitably accompanied by suffering. There is no necessary connection between goodness and happiness so far as we can see. “ Good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike.” Happiness is defined as “ the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will. ” But since man is not the cause of the world, and is not able to bring it into harmony with his practical principles, we must postulate the existence of a Being who will bring about this harmony. To insure the realization of the second element of the *summum bonum*, happiness, we postulate the existence of a Power or Being great enough to bring into accord the world and man’s moral character. Not only must such a Being have sufficient power, but he must also have the *disposition* to effect this harmony. “ The *summum bonum* is

<sup>1</sup> R., VIII, 262 ; H., V, 128. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 218.

possible in the world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character."<sup>1</sup> We assume that the same power which impels man to moral conduct is the same power which lies at the basis of nature, and will ultimately bring nature into accord with man's reason thus insuring his happiness. Such a power is God. To sum up the foregoing—the consciousness of the "ought", the consciousness of being determined by the moral law leads us to postulate freedom as the first condition of obedience to that law; secondly, the complete fulfillment of the moral law, the attainment of perfect virtue requires an eternity of existence, immortality, for the same rational being. In the third place, the demand that happiness shall be proportionate to goodness leads us to postulate the existence of a "Being distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of connexion between happiness and goodness."<sup>2</sup> Upon these three Ideas—God, Freedom, and Immortality—Ideas, which in the Critique of theoretical Reason had been declared incapable of demonstration, Kant constructed his ethical and religious systems.

Although the opposition between the Critiques of theoretical and practical philosophy extends to all of these ideas, it arises primarily and chiefly with reference to the concept of Freedom—"the fundamental concept of all unconditioned practical laws"—the corner-stone of Kant's ethical system. Theoretical Reason declares that every event in the world is connected according to the law of cause and effect, that there is only an endless chain of physical events each of which is determined by the one preceding it. Practical Reason claims for man exemption from this mechanically fixed order of

<sup>1</sup> R., VIII, 264; H., V, 130 f. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 221 f.

<sup>2</sup> R., VIII, 264; H., V, 130. Abbott, *op. cit.*, 221.

things, and endows him with the power of free, spontaneous origination, independent of external, physical influences. Practical Reason is impelled and guided by an 'ought' which theoretical Reason brushes aside as hollow and meaningless. "Our Understanding can know nothing of a natural world except what *is*, what has been, or what will be. 'Ought' has no meaning whatever in nature. We cannot inquire what ought to happen in nature, any more than we can inquire what properties a circle ought to have. The 'ought' expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept; while in every merely natural action the ground must always be a phenomenon."<sup>1</sup> It is clear, therefore, that the opposition between the first two Critiques centers about the conflict between the principles of freedom and necessity; viewed broadly it is the opposition between the teleological and mechanical views of the world. In its narrower form the question is, can there be a causality of concepts,—in the present case of moral concepts—or must all causes be conceived as material? The latter view dominated the scientific thought of Kant's time, as it does that of the present. The principles of physical science are employed not only in determining the world of matter, but are extended to the world of spirit as well. Physics can find no place for freedom, and declares our experience of it to be a delusion. The scientific position is well expressed in Spinoza's famous saying, 'that a stone and a human being are equally determined to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner,' the only difference being that the actions of man are accompanied by consciousness. "But that Reason has a causality, or at least that we represent it as having such

<sup>1</sup> R. II, 429; H. III, 379; M. II, 472.



a causality, is clear from the imperatives which in all our practical life we impose as rules upon our executive powers. The *ought* expresses a kind of necessity, a kind of connection of actions with their grounds or reasons such as is to be found nowhere else in nature.”<sup>1</sup>

The relation of the Critiques of pure and practical philosophy with reference to the problem of freedom may be further illustrated by considering two different relations in which man stands to the physical world. First, he may be thought as merely one object among an infinitude of other objects, as one atom in a sea of atoms. As such, he is subject to the same influences, is played upon and controlled by the same forces as any other object in nature. All the laws which are applicable to the physical world are applicable to him as a member of that world. He is regarded, like other objects of the phenomenal world, according to the laws of nature and necessity. All his states and changes are determined by his relation to other objects. Conceived as merely phenomenal, man is only a link in an endless chain of events which constitutes the physical series.

But to restrict ourselves to this one relation or view would be partial and inadequate. Reflection suggests another important relation in which man stands to the world of objects. In addition to his consciousness of himself as a phenomenon, as one object among other objects, man is also conscious of himself as entirely separated from and above the world of objects, out of the natural order of things, a supersensible or intelligible being, a noumenon. He feels himself to be free and independent of the phenomenal world, acting with perfect spontaneity according to laws of his own being. According to this latter view, man is independent of the affec-

<sup>1</sup> R. II, 429; H. III, 379; M. II, 472.

tions of sense, and apart from the empirically conditioned ; he is a purely intelligible being and so in virtue of the practical Reason, "which is properly and pre-eminently distinct from all empirically conditioned powers in virtue of a free will which acts from motives entirely self-derived, not on motives excited by external objects."

We have seen that the activities of man, regarded as a phenomenon, result from external influences ; but man regarded as a noumenon is under no influence except the demands of Reason, or the moral law prescribed by Reason. He finds the springs of his activity wholly within his rational nature unmixed with any external motives whatever. All his actions as a rational being spring from, and are guided by, self-derived and self-imposed laws of Reason. This manner of conceiving man's relation to the sensible world brings into prominence Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal world, between the intelligible and empirical self. As a member of the phenomenal world, man's will is subject to natural necessity ; as a member of the noumenal world, his will is under the law of freedom. Freedom is thus saved by postulating beyond the phenomenal world a noumenal or supersensible world. It is impossible to determine this noumenal world in any way whatever, but so long as we are compelled to *think* it, so long as we believe in its existence, so long are we justified in refusing to admit the universal applicability of the principles of physical science, especially may we justly exclude them from the province of the supersensible. Here the Reason lays claim to absolute dominion ; into this territory it retreats and finds security. "We are not on sufferance in our possession, when, though our own title may not be suffi-

cient, it is nevertheless quite certain that no one can ever prove its insufficiency.”<sup>1</sup> Freedom thus protects herself against the attacks of science by withdrawing from the phenomenal plane and taking refuge in a stronghold where science cannot follow. The importance of this defense for Kant is thus stated by Caird: “It protects the moral and religious life from the danger of being considered illusory *on one special ground*, viz., that it and its objects cannot be brought within the circle of ordinary experience and ordinary science, or determined by the categories that hold good there.”<sup>2</sup>

But this method of protecting freedom seems to render it utterly useless. The conception of man as a noumenon seems entirely to exclude him from all relation to, or connection with the world of experience; it places him upon an entirely different plane wholly unrelated to the phenomenal. But if man's freedom is to mean anything, if moral purposes are to be more than idle dreams, the concepts of morality must be capable of actualization in the phenomenal world. Freedom, if it is worth anything, must be able to exert an influence upon the course of events, it must be a cause in the world of nature, it must be able to mould the objects of nature with reference to the ends of freedom. If freedom is to be saved from the hollowness which threatens it, the world must be determinable in conformity to the laws of practical Reason.

It is thus seen that in Kant's ethics there is a constant struggle between the necessity of preserving the purity of the determining principles of moral activity, and the demand that in so doing the moral law shall not be degraded into a barren, abstract, contentless non-entity.

<sup>1</sup> R., II, 572; H., III, 493; M., II, 634.

<sup>2</sup> Caird, *Crit. Phil. of Kant*, II, p. 157.

There is no direct evidence that Kant was fully aware of these conflicting tendencies of his system; but when we remember the prominent place which the *summum bonum* occupies in his system, when we remember "that the promotion of the *summum bonum* is *a priori* a necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral law," we are led to think that Kant realized the absurdity of demanding obedience to the law solely for the law's sake. Man, as a rational being, cannot act without motives, and the bare law in itself affords no motive. We may suppose, therefore, that Kant was alive to the danger of depriving the notion of freedom of all worth, of emptying the moral law of all content. Accordingly he made partial provision against the hollowness and abstractness which threatened his conception of freedom and the "ought" by reference to the notion of the *summum bonum* as "the necessary object of a Will determinable by the moral law." Still, Kant never wavered in his insistence upon the doctrine that the *summum bonum* can never be regarded as a motive to virtuous conduct; for that motive is always grounded in the pure reason. And although Kant urges us to think the *summum bonum* as the proper object of a Will acting under the moral law, one still feels that he could have made more adequate provision against the danger of abstractness which hampers his doctrine by bringing the idea of the *summum bonum* into more immediate relation to the concrete life of man.

In summing up the results of the present section it may be said that the function of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to explain experience, to discover and confirm the principles, rules and presuppositions of physical science; the purpose of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is to exhibit the *a priori* rules of practical Reason,

to discover and confirm the maxims and postulates of morals and religion. The doctrines enunciated and the principles established in the two Critiques if not antagonistic are at least inconsistent, or rather wholly disparate and incommensurable. Kant's own statement brings out very clearly the province or function of each Critique, and, at the same, the contradictory character of the principles which they elaborate:—"The Understanding legislates *a priori* for nature as an object of sense: Reason legislates *a priori* for *freedom* and its peculiar causality. The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation, and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence. The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the natural concept determines nothing in respect of the practical laws of freedom. So far then it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one realm to the other."<sup>1</sup> Legislation by the Understanding is valid only for cognition; legislation by Reason is valid only for the Will. The province of the one is nature; the province of the other is the moral and religious life. There can be no mutual influence between the two realms, there must be no encroachment by either upon the domain of the other. On the one side, we see physical science asserting, in accordance with the principles of the understanding, that every event must come under the inexorable law of physical causality, that every phenomenal effect can have only a physical cause. Even the actions of man are no exception to the universality and necessity of the law of causality. On the other hand, it is maintained that 'man is possessed of an active and spontaneously energizing faculty', that he

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 36, f.; H., V, 201; B., 38.

has a causality which is free and independent of the physical world. "Reason frames for itself with perfect spontaneity a new order of things according to ideas." That is, man conceives and realizes moral ideals independently of external influences. Kant continues, "Now although an immeasurable gulf is thus placed between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom so that no transition from the first to the second is possible, yet the second is *meant* to have an influence upon the first. The concept of freedom is meant to realize in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity to law of its form, at least harmonizes with the possibilities of the purposes to be effected in it according to the laws of freedom."<sup>1</sup> The relation of the notions of nature and freedom, and so of the Critiques of pure and practical Reason, which deal respectively with those ideas, is admirably stated by Bosanquet in a passage which, at the same time, indicates the function of the *Critique of Judgment* in the Critical Philosophy: "In his life-long labor for the reorganization of philosophy, Kant may be said to have aimed at three cardinal points. First, he desired to justify the conception of a natural order; secondly, the conception of a moral order; thirdly, the conception of compatibility between the natural and the moral order. The first of these problems formed the substance of the Critique of pure Reason; the second was treated in the Critique of practical Reason; the third necessarily arose out of the relation between the other two. . . . And although the formal compatibility of nature and reason had been established by Kant, as he believed, in the negative demarcation between them which the first

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 14; H., V, 182; B. 12.

two Critiques expounded, it was inevitable that he should subsequently be led on to suggest some more positive conciliation. This attempt was made in the Critique of the Power of Judgment."<sup>1</sup> Kant finds the key to the 'more positive conciliation' between the law and order of the natural world, and the principles dominating the realm of morals, in the thought of a "ground of unity" underlying both nature and freedom. His words are: "There must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible which lies at the basis of nature with that which the concept of freedom practically contains."<sup>2</sup> The same force or power manifest in and through the natural or material world must be thought as having the same character, the same ultimate purpose, as that force which expresses itself in the will of man acting under the moral law. The law and necessity prevailing in the physical world must spring, according to the sentence quoted, from the same ground which underlies the determination of the Will in accordance with the laws of freedom. It now remains to consider the evidence for the existence of this 'ground of unity' which Kant has collected in the *Critique of Judgment*, and, also, the way in which this principle can be used to complete the results of the first two Critiques.

### § 3. KANT'S THEORY OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

In Part I, reasons were assigned for believing that when Kant began the investigation of judgments concerning the Beautiful his main purpose was to rationalize those judgments, to put them upon a firm, reasoned foundation by exhibiting the *a priori* element which underlies them. The Critiques of pure and practical

<sup>1</sup> Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, p. 256 f.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 14. H., V, 182. B., 12.

reason had established *a priori* principles for cognition and desire, and if a like work could be performed for feeling, which stands between those two faculties, the system would be complete, each part would stand upon a fully formulated basis of *a priori* truth. It was also explained how Kant came to regard *purposiveness* as the principle underlying the activity of the reflective Judgment; also how, in the course of his reflections, it occurred to him that the principle of purposiveness, which is the principle of the reflective Judgment, afforded a means of real mediation between the theoretical and the practical philosophy. But there is no attempt to apply the principle, or to illustrate what is meant by the statement that 'Judgment supplies a mediating principle between the concepts of freedom and nature.' It is useless to conjecture why Kant failed to perform this important work, why he failed to show how the results of the *Critique of Judgment* mediate in a real sense the results of the earlier Critiques. We have the bare statement that purposiveness, the principle which the reflective Judgment employs, affords a means of transition from freedom to nature, and with that statement the matter is dismissed.

Our aim, in the remaining sections of this essay, will be to follow out Kant's hint by showing how the *Critique of Judgment*, with its fundamental concept of purposiveness, mediates, or affords a principle of mediation, in a real sense between the Critiques of theoretical and practical philosophy. It will be remembered that the Critique of theoretical philosophy has to do with the realm of nature, while the Critique of practical philosophy has to do with the realm of freedom. Purposiveness, therefore, is conceived as bridging the chasm between these two realms, or to use less metaphorical language, the notion of design brings



into closer relation the modes of thought prevailing in the theoretical and practical domains. Broadly speaking, the consideration of the third Critique as a means of combining the results of the earlier Critiques resolves itself into a consideration of the evidence adduced in that Critique in support of the theory that there is purpose in nature. But it must not be inferred from this statement that Kant started with the hypothesis that nature is purposive and went in search of facts to support this hypothesis. For his method was quite the reverse of this. Certain phenomena which attracted his attention seemed inexplicable except by supposing that they were the result of design. They resisted the ordinary methods of explanation and called for a new category; that category Kant called *purposiveness*.

It may be well at this point to anticipate an inquiry that properly belongs in a later connection, and ask what is involved in the notion of purpose? What do we mean by saying that a thing is purposive, and what does it imply? In the first place, the notion of purpose implies an Intelligence which forms plans, and has the power to execute them. It implies freedom, a 'thinking Will.' Briefly put, therefore, the *Critique of Judgment* contains a description and analysis of the phenomena which compel us to believe that there is a 'thinking Will' behind the world. And this point of view is forced upon us when we are dealing with the Beautiful and with the forms of organic nature. Since these objects require us to think that purpose is the ground of their existence, they contain in themselves a union of freedom and nature; the purposiveness which they exhibit, or suggest, implies the presence of a force acting freely. Beautiful objects and organic products as members of the realm of nature are at the same time the embodiments of con-

cepts of freedom. In them we find examples of the concrete union, or blending, of the notions of freedom and nature. In other words, the Beautiful and the Organic are examples of 'concrete Ideas;' they are realized ideals.

Having explained briefly what is implied in the idea of purpose, let us return to the consideration of the notion of purposiveness as a means of uniting the parts of the Critical Philosophy. It was stated in the preceding paragraph, that in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant gives an explanation of the beautiful and the organic, and that the key to the explanation of those phenomena is found in the notion of purposiveness. These objects are explained by the idea of design; at the same time, we get an insight into the content of that idea by examining beautiful objects and the phenomena of organic nature. It will be necessary, therefore, in order to understand how the idea of design, or purposiveness mediates the results of the first two Critiques, to present Kant's theory of the Beautiful and the Organic. It will be most convenient to set forth his theory of each of these classes of phenomena separately; also to consider them separately with reference to the doctrine of mediation.

(1) *The theory of the beautiful.* In undertaking the criticism of aesthetic judgments, Kant had first to justify his subject-matter by calling attention to the fact that objects may be judged not only logically, but also aesthetically. Accordingly, we find in the opening sentence of section VII of the Introduction (which contains an epitome of the involved and elaborate analysis presented in the Critique of the aesthetical Judgment) a statement of the difference between these two classes of judgment. "Every object of sense may be judged

both aesthetically and logically, *i. e.*, we may judge it logically with reference to its relation to other objects; we may also judge it aesthetically with reference to the pleasure or pain experienced by the person apprehending it." That is, accompanying the mere cognition of every object, there is an *affective* experience which may be either pleasurable or painful. By drawing this distinction Kant prepares the way for his discussion of the experience of the beautiful. His purpose is to call to mind a class of judgments which are distinctly judgments about the aesthetic character of objects. If we leave out of account the experience of the painful, and consider only the pleasurable, in this case the beautiful experience, the account would run as follows: There is bound up with the cognition of certain objects of nature and of art a *pleasurable feeling* which cannot be an element of cognition. In addition to our *knowledge* of these objects, we have a consciousness of the harmony of their representations with the conditions of knowledge in general, a feeling of pleasure in the more lively play of the mental powers which the idea of the object produces. This pleasure is not an element, but a mere *accompaniment* of the cognition of such objects. To apprehend an object is quite different from being conscious of the feeling of pleasure aroused by and attendant upon that apprehension. This pleasurable feeling, we are told, is the result of the mutual subjective harmony of the cognitive faculties—Imagination and Understanding—in the cognition of an object. It is a feeling occasioned by a harmonious, or accordant activity of the imagination in its freedom with the understanding in its conformity to law. Certain objects of nature or of art produce this harmony of the cognitive faculties which contains the ground of

this pleasure.<sup>1</sup> The representations of these objects are adapted to throw the faculties of imagination and understanding into accord—such objects are said to be Beautiful.

So far, Kant's analysis of judgments of beauty does not enable us to distinguish that class of judgments from two other classes, viz., judgments of the Pleasant and the Good. Yet, as will be seen later, it is of the highest importance for Kant that he should keep the experience of the beautiful entirely distinct and separate from that of the pleasant and the good. The first step in making clear this distinction is to refer aesthetical judgments to a special faculty—the faculty of Taste.<sup>2</sup> It then becomes necessary to analyze judgments of taste in order to show what is required to warrant us in calling an object beautiful as distinguished from the pleasant and the good. Kant has a double purpose in this analysis: first, he wishes to indicate the characteristics of the beautiful and point out its prominent features; and secondly, he wished at the same time to show how it differs from these other forms of experience. Accordingly, we find the analysis and description of the beautiful running parallel to the process of differentiating the beautiful from the good and the pleasant.

While it is true that the two purposes are coördinate, it seems certain that Kant's one great aim was to remove every possibility of confusing the beautiful with either the pleasant or the good, to win for it a definite field of experience of which it is the sole occupant. One often suspects that the desire to make rigid this distinction was paramount to the desire to determine the nature of the Beautiful, that the former motive deter-

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 39. H., V, 203. B., 40, 64, 66, 67, 69.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 45. H., V, 207. B., 45 note.

mined the moments or characteristics of beauty rather than the analysis resulting in the conviction that the beautiful experience has a peculiar nature. But in truth the one process involves the other. The process of analysis involves a characterization of the Beautiful which, at the same time, marks it off from the pleasant and the good. The work of distinguishing the aesthetic from every other experience involves also the work of indicating its peculiar qualities.

Keeping in mind then that Kant has a two-fold purpose before him, let us proceed to a statement of his execution of it. Facility of presentation will be gained by adhering somewhat closely to Kant's order of procedure, artificial though it is.<sup>1</sup> His analysis may be followed with advantage though it is violently and unnaturally made to conform to the convenient but rigid, mechanical framework of the Categories of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Modality. Under each of these categories one finds a description of one of the essential qualities or characteristics of aesthetic judgment. One finds also under each category a feature pointed out which helps to distinguish the beautiful from the pleasant and the good.

(a) *Quality* of aesthetic Judgments. It was seen in a preceding paragraph that the judgment of taste is an aesthetical, and not a logical judgment, because it has reference, not to the relations of objects to one another, but to the relations of the object to the subject's feeling

<sup>1</sup> The artificial character of Kant's divisions is perhaps more clearly seen in the *Critique of Judgment* than in any of his other works. He seemed to feel that there was something peculiarly significant in the plan of the first Critique, and took especial pains to make the Critiques of Practical Reason and Judgment correspond in every way to it. The influence of this tendency has been well explained and illustrated by E. Adickes: *Kant's Systematik als system—bildender Factor.*

of pleasure and pain. It must also be *disinterested* to distinguish it from the pleasant on the one hand, and from the good on the other. For when we pronounce an object 'pleasant' we express an interest in its existence; we desire the object, or that it shall continue to exist. "Hence we do not merely say of the pleasant, *it pleases*, but it gratifies. We give to it no mere assent, but inclination is aroused by it."<sup>1</sup> The pleasant has a reference to the faculty of desire; the satisfaction it brings is sensuously conditioned: but the judgment of taste is merely contemplative; it is a judgment which, indifferent as regards the existence of the object, compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and pain.<sup>2</sup> The mere representation of a beautiful object, apart altogether from any inclination towards it, is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction.

It is equally necessary to distinguish the beautiful from the *good*. The good is whatever pleases us by means of Reason through the mere concept. It pleases because it is the realization of an idea or plan. We must always know what sort of thing the object *ought* to be before we can determine whether or not it is good. But this implies an interest in the existence of the object, and thus conflicts with the doctrine that judgments of taste are wholly *disinterested*. An aesthetic judgment does not imply any interest in the existence of the object, but is based solely upon its fitness to produce a pleasurable feeling by its mere form. Thus it is seen that judgments of the pleasant and the good agree in the fact that both are always bound up with an interest in their object. Both have reference to the faculty of desire, and bring with them a satisfaction which is de-

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 49. H., V, 210. B., 50.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 53. H., V, 213. B., 53.

terminated not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented connection of the subject with the existence of the object.<sup>1</sup> The feeling of beauty, on the other hand, leaves the mind entirely free and disinterested as regards the existence of the object; no interest either of sense, or of reason, impels us to judge a thing beautiful. The mind is content to rest in a state of mere contemplation.

(b) *Quantity* of aesthetic judgments. We saw in the preceding paragraphs that the satisfaction one feels in the beautiful object is wholly disinterested; it may be supposed, therefore, to be grounded on conditions common to all men. Since the subject, in judging a thing as beautiful, believes himself to be quite *free* as regards the satisfaction which he attaches to the object, he concludes that his satisfaction is not based on conditions peculiar to himself. He, therefore, regards his judgment as grounded on what he can presuppose as existing in every other person's mind. Consequently, he assumes that every one will find a similar satisfaction in the object he calls beautiful. He ascribes the characteristic 'beauty' to the object in the same way that he makes a logical judgment concerning it. In other words, we assume that the relation of the cognitive faculties suitable for cognition in general is the same in all persons, and that if we find that the apprehension of a given object throws our mind, or mental powers, into a harmonious state, we assume that the same object will produce the same effect in every other person's mind.

This quality of *universality* which judgments of taste are supposed to possess affords Kant another means of distinguishing those judgments from judgments of the pleasant and the good, or perfect. It is said with refer-

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 52. H., V, 213. B., 52, f.

ence to the pleasant, that every one is content that his judgment should be merely individual ; that the fundamental proposition as regards the pleasant is, '*every one has his own taste*'; whereas, judgments of the beautiful are thought to have universal validity. That is, when a person pronounces an object beautiful, he assumes that all other persons will give their assent to his judgment. With respect to judgments of perfection, it is true that they claim universality ; "but these judgments are based upon concepts of objects of universal satisfaction, and thus are different from judgments of the beautiful which do not rest upon concepts but upon a subjective relation of the cognitive powers."<sup>1</sup>

(c) *Relation of the judgment of taste.* Under the category of *relation*, Kant explains the doctrine that in the aesthetic judgment there is implied the notion of "*purposiveness without purpose*." We think purpose when not only the cognition of an object, but the object itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect possible only by means of a purpose.<sup>2</sup> But we also presuppose the representation of purpose when the possibility of an object, or state of mind can be explained only by assuming as its ground a causality according to purposes. In this latter case, we have "*purposiveness without purpose*," so far as we do not refer the object or state of mind directly to a Will, although we can make it intelligible only by driving it from a Will.<sup>3</sup> Now we have seen that judgments of taste cannot be based upon concepts of purposes either internal or external. They cannot be based upon the adaptation of objects to excite a feeling of pleasure, because in that case the judgment

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 58. H., V, 217. B., 58.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 66. H., V, 224. B., 67.

<sup>3</sup> R., IV, 67. H., V, 225. B., 68.



would carry with it an interest. Nor is it possible to base it upon the concept of an external purpose, for we do not call an object beautiful because it realizes a plan. To judge an object beautiful goes no further than to assert its fitness to produce a harmonious working of the cognitive faculties in apprehending it. The judgment of taste expresses a *relation* of purposiveness or adaptation, but it does not regard the adaptation as the result of design. We require the idea of purpose as a principle of explanation, but there is no trace of that idea in the act of judging an object aesthetically.

Kant employs the doctrine that aesthetic judgments imply 'purposiveness without purpose' to give further emphasis to the distinction already drawn between aesthetic and logical judgments. The importance of enforcing this distinction at every stage of the discussion will be explained in detail in a subsequent section. It is sufficient to note, in this connection, that Kant was contending all the while against the Wolffian dictum that, 'Beauty is merely Perfection confusedly apprehended.')

(d) *Modality* of aesthetic judgments. Under the category of *modality*, Kant sets forth the grounds for ascribing the attribute of *necessity* to aesthetic judgments. That necessity, he explains, is of a peculiar kind; for, while we can compel assent to logical judgments, judgments of taste are only 'exemplary'. That is, in the latter case we can only say that "every one *ought* to give his approval to the object in question and describe it as beautiful." <sup>1</sup> The ground of this belief is found in the Idea of a *common sense* which is defined as "the faculty of feeling the effect resulting from the free play

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 88 f. H., V, 243. B., 92.

of the cognitive powers." <sup>2</sup> And since all persons have like cognitive faculties, we suppose that an object which arouses the feeling of beauty in one person's mind will of necessity arouse the same feeling in all other minds.

We have seen in the preceding paragraphs that the analytic of the aesthetic Judgment involves a consideration of judgments of taste from four points of view: quality, quantity, relation, and modality. With reference to the first aspect or characteristic (quality), aesthetic Judgments were said to be entirely *disinterested*. There is no interest in the existence of the object. With reference to the second, (quantity) they are universally valid; all persons are expected to agree in their aesthetic judgments of objects. The reason for ascribing universality to judgments of taste rests upon the assumption that all persons have like cognitive faculties, and, also, a common sense, or faculty, of judging respecting the relation of those faculties. The *relation* expressed by judgments of taste is one of adaptation, or purposiveness; but this adaptation is not regarded as the result of design, *i. e.*, it expresses a relation of purposiveness without purpose (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*). Lastly, the *modality* of judgments of taste is that of necessity, and is based, like the characteristic of universality, upon the idea of a sense common to all persons. These marks—disinterestedness, universality, necessity, and purposiveness without purpose—besides describing aesthetic judgments—serve to mark them off from judgments about the pleasant and the good. It is now necessary to examine more in detail some of the main features of Kant's theory in order to understand its significance in his philosophy as a whole, and also to enable us to see how, in the beautiful object, there is a media-

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 89. H., V, 244. B., 93.

tion of freedom and nature. The concepts which seem to require further elucidation and discussion are: (1) the doctrine that beauty depends upon the harmonious working of imagination and understanding, (2) the distinction between aesthetic judgments and judgments of perfection, (3) the doctrine that judgments of taste imply 'purposiveness without purpose,' (4) the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgments. After examining these four phases of Kant's theory an attempt will be made to show how the design implied in judgments of taste is, at the same time, evidence of mediation between nature and freedom. That is, it will be shown that in the beautiful object that mediation is thought to be effected.

(a) *The doctrine of harmony.* The most prominent feature in Kant's theory of the beautiful is the doctrine that the feeling of beauty depends upon the mutual subjective harmony of the cognitive faculties—Imagination and Understanding. All the parts of the theory center about the idea of harmony. In order, therefore, to a clearer and more exact understanding of Kant's doctrine, it becomes of highest importance to determine, if possible, exactly what is meant by the rather formidable phrase, 'mutual subjective harmony of the cognitive faculties,' and also what are the implications of the thought it contains.

In this investigation it will be necessary to inquire, first, how does Kant define each of the cognitive faculties in the *Critique of pure Reason*? What function does he assign to each, and what are the relations of the different faculties to each other; and, in particular, how are Imagination and Understanding, whose mutual harmony is at the basis of the experience of the beautiful, distinguished in the first Critique? Kant enumerates

three steps or processes in the cognition of objects: receptivity, synthesis, and recognition. Corresponding to these three steps are three cognitive faculties: sense, imagination, and understanding. "There are three subjective sources of knowledge on which the possibility of all experience and all knowledge depends, viz., sense, imagination, and understanding. (Apperception)"<sup>1</sup> In one respect the cognitive process may be conceived as beginning with Sense, which is defined as the faculty of receiving impressions according to the manner in which we are affected by objects.<sup>2</sup> It is the faculty which contributes the raw material, the scattered, disconnected manifold which the Understanding works up into knowledge. Kant elsewhere defines sensibility as "the receptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving impressions whenever it is in any wise affected."<sup>3</sup> But if one stops with the work of sense one will have only a manifold of single, disconnected sense impressions; there will be no order or unity in them; they will pass before the mind as fleeting, isolated pictures before a mirror. Moreover, if every single representation stood by itself, as if isolated and separated from all others, nothing like what we call knowledge could ever arise. For "knowledge forms a whole of representations connected and compared with each other."<sup>4</sup> The elements of knowledge, the manifold, must be collected, synthesized, or unified, as Kant variously calls the next stage of the process. This second step is the work of imagination, "a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R., II, 90, 105. H., III, 112. M., II, pp. 84, 101.

<sup>2</sup> R., II, 32 note. H., III, 56. M., II, 17.

<sup>3</sup> R., II, 56. H., III, 82. M., II, 45.

<sup>4</sup> R., II, 92. H., III, 566. M., II, 87.

<sup>5</sup> R., II, 77. H., III, 99. M., II, 69.

The single, isolated, disconnected perceptions must have a connection, such as they cannot receive from mere sense, before they can be referred to an object of knowledge. "There exists in us, therefore, an active power for the synthesis of the manifold which we call imagination, and the function of which, as applied to perceptions, I call apprehension. This imagination is meant to change the manifold into an Image."<sup>1</sup> But this synthesis of the manifold by imagination does not yet produce knowledge; there is still required the work of the understanding, "the faculty of thinking an object in the manifold of sense by means of the categories."<sup>2</sup> There is still necessary a faculty which is able to recognize and bring to light the principle of unity present in the manifold synthesized by imagination. Understanding recognizes the identity of the representations which are synthesised by imagination with the phenomena by which they were given; *i. e.*, the understanding gives the representations an objective reference. The understanding is defined, finally, as the faculty of judging, *i. e.*, of referring the perceptions of sense to a concept. In this exercise of understanding, there is a consciousness of a unity in the perceptions; whereas, the unity formed by imagination is unconscious. Understanding recognizes the manner or means by which the raw material of sense is collected by the imagination. Knowledge or experience, therefore, is the product of the combined activities of these three powers: Sense, the faculty of receiving impressions; Imagination, the faculty of "blindly combining these impressions into an image;" and Understanding, "the faculty of recognizing in that image the universality of the rule according to which the synthesis takes place."

<sup>1</sup> R., II, 109. H., 579. M., II, 105.

<sup>2</sup> R., II, 79. H., III, 100 f. M., II, 71.

This account of the origin of knowledge, or experience, taken from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is found, on comparison, to be the same as the doctrine Kant had in mind when the *Critique of Judgment* was written. It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the theory of knowledge advanced in the last named Critique. It will be sufficient to say that in the *Critique of Judgment*, Sense is conceived as a faculty of receiving impressions; Imagination, as the faculty of combining those impressions into an image; Understanding, as the faculty of recognizing in the image a unity by means of concepts. Sense supplies a disconnected, raw material; Imagination reduces that discrete matter to unity; Understanding reveals the principle of unity by means of the categories.<sup>1</sup>

We are now prepared to proceed to the main question of this section, viz., what does Kant mean by the 'harmony' of Imagination and Understanding which is the immediate occasion of the experience of the beautiful.<sup>2</sup> Etymologically the word 'harmony' suggests a fitting or joining together, (*ἀρμόζεν*). The word was used primarily to indicate the external fitting together of the parts of a system: and, indeed, it retains much of its original meaning. The prominent element in the idea is still that of a complete correspondence of part to part. A perfect joint in mechanics, a skilful dovetail, a pair of cogwheels the teeth of which mesh with exactness yet without friction, a piece of music whose notes have their proper places with reference to the other notes are thought of as instances of harmony, or adaptation. Moreover, the system which Kant discovered or

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 90. H., V, 244. B., 93.

<sup>2</sup> I say 'immediate occasion' because the feeling of beauty is occasioned primarily by the beautiful object.

devised in the *Critique of Pure Reason* which produces Knowledge—the framework of which is reproduced in the *Critique of Judgment*—justifies a more or less mechanical representation of the idea of harmony. For, as we have seen, the Imagination as a piece of that mechanism—the faculty of collecting and converting into an image the manifold supplied by Sense,—is separate and distinct in its activity from the Understanding and its activity. A beautiful object then, a harmony-producing-object is one the raw material of which will permit an accordant, frictionless movement of these faculties. Beautiful objects are those whose elements or manifold are easily prepared by Imagination for recognition by the Understanding. They are objects whose elements are not stubborn and unruly, but plastic, and willing to be worked up into knowledge. Or again, at the risk of making Kant's theory of knowledge ridiculously mechanical; one may conceive the work of Imagination to consist in so moulding the manifold of sense that it may be given the stamp of recognition by the Understanding. If this manner of representing Kant's notion of harmony seems too concrete, too mechanical, we may take the more abstract statement that "harmony of the cognitive faculties means a state most favorable for both faculties in respect of cognition in general."

But whatever method we employ to make intelligible the doctrine of harmony between imagination and understanding as the ground of the experience of the beautiful, it is soon felt that an explanation of the feeling of beauty by reference to the harmonious play of the cognitive faculties is wholly incomplete and unsatisfactory. It is incomplete because it fails to indicate the relation of those faculties to the object judged beautiful. It fails

to point out the relation of the cognitive faculties to the object which occasions the beautiful experience. It treats the activities of those faculties as if it were isolated and unrelated to the sense-world, while as a matter of fact the fundamental harmony is necessarily between the sense-product on the one hand and the activity of understanding on the other, *i. e.*, the harmony is fundamentally, not between Imagination and Understanding, but between nature on the one hand and mind on the other. The harmony of imagination and understanding may be regarded as the *immediate* cause of the feeling of beauty, but the ultimate cause, or ground, is in the harmony between the beautiful object and the cognitive faculties. The statement that an object excites the imagination and understanding to harmonious activity is only another way of saying that the object is adapted to, or is in harmony with, the activity of the faculty of knowing. The harmony of imagination and understanding implies a high degree of adaptation in certain objects to the faculty of cognition in general; it implies that some objects are purposive with reference to the mutual agreement of sense-products and the activity of the understanding. By regarding harmony as the ground of the feeling of beauty, Kant has reference *directly* to the relation of imagination and understanding; indirectly, to the relation between the sense world and the faculty of cognition in general. That this latter is the real and fundamental harmony, becomes evident when we consider the section containing the solution of the antinomy which arises with reference to judgments of taste.<sup>1</sup> The following passages from that section may be cited in support of this position: "the judgment of taste is based upon the concept of the general ground of the sub-

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 214 ff. H., V, 350 ff. B., 231 ff.



jective purposiveness of nature for the faculty of knowledge." <sup>1</sup> In another connection, the idea of the supersensible substrate is referred to as "the ground of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty." <sup>2</sup> Here we have an explicit statement that the relation of purposiveness obtains between nature and mind.

Another passage which gives additional strength to the view that the harmony of imagination and understanding rests upon the deeper harmony between nature and reason, or mind, may be quoted from the section on the *Idealism of purposiveness*; "The *property of nature* that gives us occasion to perceive the *inner purposiveness in the relation of our mental faculties* in judging certain of its products cannot be a natural purpose, etc." That is, certain features of nature are specially adapted to excite the pleasurable activity of the mental faculties. But it is unnecessary to seek for more explicit statements than the oft recurring one that the beautiful object is one adapted to produce such an accordant activity of imagination and understanding as is requisite for cognition in general. Beautiful objects are also sense objects, and to say that they are purposive with reference to the mental powers and their employment is equivalent to saying that they are purposive for the activity of mind, or reason. The conclusion is, therefore, that the free play, the relation of harmony between the cognitive faculties, which is the immediate occasion of the feeling of beauty, rests upon the peculiar adaptation of certain natural objects to the activity of mind in general. Primarily, the harmony is not between imagination and understanding but between nature on the one hand and the

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 216. H., V, 351. B. 233.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 223. H., V, 357. B., 241.

knowing mind on the other, or between percept and concept. We are thus led to see that, and how, the feeling of beauty is a revelation of the fact of mediation between freedom and nature.

(b) *Distinction between Beauty and Perfection.* In the exposition of the theory of beauty it was observed that its most conspicuous feature is the emphasis laid upon the difference between the Beautiful and the Good. It was noted that Kant's great and constant purpose was to remove every possibility of confounding judgments of taste with judgments of the good, or perfect. One might go further and say that the whole of the Critique of the aesthetical Judgment was planned and executed with a view to enforcing that distinction; that every argument was framed with the clear purpose of driving home the doctrine that the two classes of judgments are radically different.

Before examining those arguments and their implications, it will be convenient to digress at this point and seek for an explanation of Kant's vigilance in guarding the peculiarity and distinctness which he had assigned to aesthetic judgments. Why was he so anxious to establish the individuality, the separateness, of judgments of taste? What is the origin of his interest in marking off that class of judgments from every other? The answer, I believe, is suggested by the following considerations: Kant's original purpose, according to the theory advanced in Part I of this inquiry, was to find an *a priori* ground for the faculty of Feeling as had been done for Intellect and Will. The idea of completeness and symmetry demanded that the feeling experience should be rationalized and grounded in *a priori* principles which are separate and distinct from the principles underlying the activity of cognition and desire.

Another consideration that prompted Kant to claim for aesthetic judgments a peculiar nature, was the fact that since Understanding and Reason furnish the *a priori* grounds for intellect and will, it may be supposed that Judgment—the third of the supreme cognitive faculties—will perform a similar work for feeling. But if aesthetic judgments are resolved into judgments of perfection, it is clear that their guiding principle is derived not from Judgment, but from the Understanding, *i. e.*, that they are based upon a concept, or idea, of what the thing should be. The doctrine that beauty is perfection confusedly apprehended, clearly leaves no place for judgments based upon a peculiar and distinct principle supplied by the faculty of Judgment. That was the view Kant took of the matter. He had a sort of jealousy towards the Understanding lest it should encroach upon a territory which rightfully belongs to Judgment. If judgments of taste can be based upon concepts similar to those upon which judgments of the good rest, then the distinctness of the aesthetic judgment is lost, or rather it has no need of additional grounds of activity. Moreover, Kant saw that if the Wolffians were right in maintaining that the feeling of beauty is only a confused judgment of perfection, then the search for an *a priori* principle which shall serve as a guide for the activities of a faculty which has no special and distinguishing characteristic, no peculiar employment, is clearly useless and absurd.

We shall now proceed to examine the arguments advanced by Kant to enforce the distinction between judgments of beauty and judgments of perfection. The problem, as it framed itself in Kant's mind was : Is beauty perfection apprehended through the senses ? Is the judgment that an object is beautiful merely the forerunner of a

possible judgment that the object is an instance of the perfect blending of a manifold with a given concept? May the same object be judged beautiful from one standpoint and perfect from another? If these questions are answered in the affirmative then obviously there is no difference between the beautiful object of Kant and the beautiful object of the Wolffians. In that case, the difference between the two theories, upon which Kant lays so much emphasis, must be sought elsewhere than in the *character of the objects* pronounced beautiful. It must be found in the nature of the judgments, or rather, in a difference in attitude on the part of the subject judging. The Wolffians implied in the judgment that an object is beautiful, the further judgment that it is also perfect. They maintained that the aesthetic judgment implies a logical judgment respecting the nature of the object. Kant, on the other hand, insists over and over again, that the judgment of taste, *qua* judgment of taste, says absolutely nothing respecting the nature of the object except that it is adapted to excite a harmonious interaction of Imagination and Understanding. The Wolffians would say, 'I apprehend confusedly by Feeling the perfect union of the raw material of Sense with a concept of the Understanding.' Kant would say, 'I apprehend absolutely nothing regarding the character of the object, nor is anything further implied in the judgment of taste than the fitness of a given object to produce a free play of Imagination and Understanding.' The ground of that fitness is not known, it is not sought for. The judgment of beauty is limited to the mere ascription of a contemplative delight which a given object produces.

It would carry us far beyond our present purpose to attempt an evaluation of Kant's proposed modification of

aesthetical theory. Yet, the remark may be ventured that Kant made a decided improvement upon the theory of aesthetics which he had inherited from the Wolffian school by his strong insistence upon the distinction between the feeling of beauty and the cognition of perfection. The Wolffian doctrine that beauty is perfection indistinctly or confusedly apprehended, and the inherent implication that the two are at bottom identical, entirely neglects the emotional element in the experience of beauty. That theory is purely rationalistic, and, if it is consistent, derives beauty entirely from rational factors. But, as Kant rightly maintains, experience of beauty is not a recognition, even though confused, of the conformity of an object to an idea, or concept; and his insistence that the two classes of judgments should rigorously be kept apart is fully justified. For the instant one judges an object according to a plan, the moment one asks whether the object realizes a purpose, that moment one ceases to regard the object aesthetically. In that case the emotional element, which constitutes the beautiful experience, is displaced by a logical judgment. But, in reality, we do not come to beautiful objects with an ideal standard to which they must conform; rather we feel or experience the ideal through the harmonious play of our faculties. Kant's clear recognition of this fact, his tendency to suppress the cognitive and emphasize the emotional element, renders his theory decidedly superior to that of his immediate predecessors.

Admitting the correctness and value of the contribution which Kant made to the theory of Aesthetics in thus freeing judgments of taste from any reference to the perfection or imperfection of an object, must we not say after all that the beautiful object *is* a perfect object in that it is an embodiment of an idea or concept of the

Understanding? Must we not say that although the idea of perfection does not enter into the mere judgment of taste, yet the perfect harmony of a manifold with a concept is at the basis of the feeling of beauty? Kant did not discuss this question. He nowhere explicitly affirms or denies that a beautiful object may also be regarded as a perfect object. The single point upon which he insists is, *that at the time beauty is experienced* there is no concept or purpose present to the mind of the person judging. Although there are no explicit statements on the subject, there is abundant evidence available to support the theory that the beautiful object and the perfect object are identical in character, that both are actualizations of an idea or concept. The clearest proof of this is derived from the cardinal doctrine of the theory, viz., that the beautiful object is one whose form harmonizes with the faculty of cognition in general; that the pleasure which beauty excites is the result of the agreement of an object with the empirical use of the judgment in general which consists in referring intuitions of Imagination to concepts of the Understanding.<sup>1</sup> Now the perfect object is a union of percept and concept; that the same description will apply to the beautiful object will be evident when it is remembered that the experience of the beautiful results from the free play between Imagination (the faculty of percepts) and Understanding (the faculty of concepts). There is a union of percept and concept in both beauty and perfection. In the one, notice is taken merely of the *free relation, the harmonious state of the faculties employed in the process*, and because of that harmonious relation the object is judged beautiful. In judgments of perfection, attention is centered upon the *character of the object*; it

<sup>1</sup>R., IV, 30 f. H., V, 196. B., 31.

is said to be a union of percept and concept, and, therefore, is perfect.

The same doctrine may be stated in a slightly different form by considering Kant's way of conceiving the relations of the activities and products of Imagination and Understanding. The work of imagination consists in referring a combined manifold to a concept of the understanding. That object whose manifold is most easily reducible to a concept is the beautiful object, because it permits the free play of those faculties. Such an object is also perfect, because perfection consists in the agreement of manifold and concept. The work and general relation of the faculties of imagination and understanding in the apprehension of an object which *is not* beautiful are the same as in the apprehension of an object which *is* beautiful. In both cases there is a reference of percepts to concepts, the difference being entirely in the purposiveness which some objects display to put those faculties in more harmonious relations. In the case of the beautiful object, and in the case of the object not beautiful, the relation of the cognitive powers is the one most suitable for the cognition of the particular object. But the relation most suitable for *cognition in general* must be that in which the employment of the faculty of percepts is in perfect accord with that of the faculty of concepts. That harmonious relation is the cause of the feeling of beauty. The conclusion, therefore, is that if the perfect object is defined as one in which there is a perfect union of percept and concept, of matter and idea, then the beautiful object is also capable of being regarded as a perfect object. But the fact that it is perfect, that it is the embodiment of an idea, the fulfillment of a concept, is not present to consciousness when one experiences the feeling of beauty.

It remains to indicate the relation of the conclusion of the present discussion, viz., that the feeling of beauty is grounded primarily upon the union of percept and concept, to the doctrine that the accordance of Imagination and Understanding is based upon the fundamental harmony of Mind and Nature. The two conclusions are in accord and are mutually explanatory. Since the feeling of beauty rests upon the harmonious relation of Imagination (the faculty of percepts) and Understanding, (the faculty of concepts) and since the one contributes to the structure of knowledge a synthesized manifold derived from the sense-world (nature), and the other contains the principle of recognizing the unity in that synthesis (a mental factor), it is clear that the expression "harmony of nature and mind" is identical in meaning with the expression 'harmony of percept and concept.'

(c) *Purposiveness without purpose.* Complementary to the distinction which Kant draws between the judgment of taste and the judgment of perfection, is the doctrine that the former has reference to a purposiveness *without* purpose, while the latter involves a purposiveness *with* purpose. That is, in judgments of taste we think purpose, but we are not warranted in supposing that the object judged beautiful is the result of purpose. When it is said that the beautiful object is an instance of "purposiveness without purpose," we mean that although no concept is needed as a point of reference for the object in order to judge it beautiful—nay, more, the reference to a concept would mar the purity of the judgment—yet we are compelled to assume as a principle of explanation the existence of a designing intelligence as the ground of the purposiveness exhibited by the beautiful in nature and art. "Although we cannot place the cause of the purposive form of beautiful objects



in a Will, we can only make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves by deriving it from a Will."<sup>1</sup> We must think the beautiful object *as if* it owed its form and its adaptation to our cognitive powers, to the work of a designing Intelligence.

Kant repeats the doctrine of "purposiveness without purpose" in the section on The Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art, etc.<sup>2</sup> Those who maintain the *realism* of the purposiveness of nature regard the adaptation of natural objects to our cognitive faculties as *designed*. This view seems to find support in "the beautiful formations in the kingdom of organized nature," since we might assume that behind the production of those formations there is an Idea of the beautiful in the producing cause, viz., a purpose in respect of our imagination."<sup>3</sup> Those who maintain the *ideality* of purposiveness in nature, while admitting that there is just such an agreement as there would be if designed, yet point out, first, that nature everywhere shows in its free formations much mechanical tendency to the production of forms which seem to be made for the aesthetical exercise of our Judgment, without affording the least ground for supposing that there is need of anything more than mechanism for their production."<sup>4</sup> For example, crystallization in all its various forms often presents beautiful shapes, but it apparently takes place according to purely mechanical laws without reference to any design whatever. If mere mechanism is sufficient to explain beautiful formations in the inorganic world, why is it not sufficient to explain the beautiful in organic nature?

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 67. H., V, 225. B., 68.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 223. H., V, 357. B., 241 f.

<sup>3</sup> R., IV, 225. H., V, 359. B., 243.

<sup>4</sup> R., IV, 225. H., III, 357. B., 243.

But there is another and stronger reason for maintaining the ideality of the purposiveness of Nature ; the fact, viz., that in "judging beauty we invariably seek its gauge in ourselves *a priori*." <sup>2</sup> In aesthetic judgments we do not consider what nature is in itself, or in relation to ourselves, but "how we take it." We do not judge that nature shows us favor—that would be a judgment of *objective* purposiveness—but that we receive nature with favor, that it is subjectively purposive. To maintain the reality of the purposiveness of beautiful objects is equivalent to saying that they were produced according to some design. This, however, contradicts an essential feature of the beautiful, viz., that its purposiveness is undesigned, merely subjective, and based wholly upon the harmonious relation of the cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding. The purposiveness which nature displays in beautiful objects must be conceived as undesigned ; it is a "purposiveness without purpose".

Finally, it may be pointed out that the doctrine of 'purposiveness without purpose' is merely another aspect or statement of an important feature of Kant's theory already discussed that aesthetic judgments are entirely free from any reference to purpose or concept of purpose, except the concept, or Idea, of a supersensible ground of purpose to be considered hereafter.

(d) *Universality and necessity of aesthetic judgments.* One more important feature of Kant's theory remains to be considered, namely, the ground of the *universality* and *necessity* claimed for judgments of taste. In the *Analytic*, Kant bases the universality and necessity which he ascribes to aesthetic judgments upon the Idea of a *universal voice*, or common sense, which has the power of perceiving the agreement or disagreement, the

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 228. H., III, 361. B., 246.

harmony or disharmony of the representative faculties in apprehending objects of nature or art. Having assumed that the process of cognition is the same in all persons, Kant held that nothing more is needed to give a universally valid estimate of the aesthetic character of objects, than a sense, or faculty of judging aesthetically, common to all persons.

Kant left the matter in this somewhat unsatisfactory form in the *Analytic*, but doubtless clearly realized the difficulty of attributing universality and necessity to aesthetic judgments without admitting at the same time that such judgments must be based upon concepts. But he could not make this admission without violating the cardinal principle that judgments of taste are wholly independent of any reference to concepts. Accordingly, an attempt is made in the solution of the antinomy of taste to discover a different ground for the universality and necessity ascribed to aesthetic judgments. In fact, the antinomy is essentially a statement of the difficulty, just referred to, of claiming universality and necessity for aesthetic judgments without basing them upon concepts. The antinomy is stated thus: "Thesis—The judgment of taste is *not* based upon concepts. Anti-thesis—The judgment of taste *is* based upon concepts." The antinomy is solved by showing that the 'concept' to which we refer the object in this class of judgments is not taken in the same sense in both thesis and anti-thesis.<sup>1</sup> It is plain that the object cannot be referred to a concept of the understanding, for in that case it would become a logical and not an aesthetical judgment. Still, the judgment of taste must refer to some concept; otherwise, we could not ascribe to it universality and necessity. But it is not a concept that affords a ground of

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 214 ff. H., V, 350 f. B., 231.

proof, or one through which we can know anything. It is "the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it) regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal."<sup>1</sup> That is, at the basis of judgments of taste is the concept, or idea, of a supersensible substrate of both object and subject.

But how, the reader will ask, does the mere idea of a ground common to the object perceived and the perceiving mind afford proof that aesthetic judgments are universally valid? Kant's discussion at this point is a hopeless tangle of broken sentences and obscure phrases, and one can do no more than guess at its main threads. In the first place, Kant repeats, in slightly altered form, the theory that beauty depends upon the free play of imagination and understanding. According to his modified statement, the idea of a supersensible substrate for imagination, the faculty of percepts, and understanding, the faculty of concepts, is the ground of their mutual adaptation. Now it is far from clear what Kant means by 'supersensible substrate, etc.,' but it is probable that in these words we have another expression of the thought contained in the well-known passage of the Introduction to the first Critique :—"There are *two stems* of human knowledge, which perhaps may spring from a *common root* unknown to us, etc." In that case, the adaptation of the cognitive faculties results from the fact of identity of ground, or origin. The activity of Sense is in harmony with the activity of Understanding, because both activities spring from a common source. They are thought as merely different modes in which the supersensible reality expresses itself.

After establishing a new ground for the adaptation of

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 216. H., V, 351. B., 233.

the cognitive faculties, the next step in the argument is to explain the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgments by reference to "the concept of the general ground of the subjective purposiveness of nature for the faculty of cognition in general." Kant assumes, in the first place, that there is a Reason common to all human beings; and, secondly, that nature is adapted to the employment of that Reason. This is sufficient to account for the universal validity of logical judgments, but it is not so clear how it will justify one in attributing that quality to judgments of taste. Kant maintains, however, that the idea of a common ground, or substrate, of *humanity*, taken with the idea of a ground, or substrate, of both *nature* and *Reason* will account for the purposiveness which certain objects display with reference to the employment of our faculties, and, also, for the universal validity of the aesthetic judgments we make concerning those objects.

(e) *The beautiful object a union of freedom and nature.* It remains to conclude this section by emphasizing the thought that the beautiful object affords an example of a reconciliation between the realms of nature and freedom, and that the judgment of beauty is a revelation, or expression, of that mediation. It will be helpful to raise anew the questions: What is meant by mediation of nature and freedom, and what would constitute such a mediation? We have already seen that Kant means by 'realm of nature' the realm of the material, sense-world considered as a system of phenomena in space and time strictly subject to the law of natural necessity. It has also been shown that the 'realm of freedom' is the realm of ideas, or purposes, and that it is not subject to the ordinary laws of nature. Now a reconciliation or mediation of these two realms would be effected by

actualizing an idea, or purpose, in the material world. Freedom is the principle, or power, of originating ideals and purposes, and when we find evidence of the work of this power in the physical world we have an example of mediated nature and freedom. If such an example can be found we may say the ideal has become real, and that it has taken on a concrete body and form. This thought may be illustrated by thinking of the work of the sculptor who undertakes to delineate in a rough piece of marble his idea of any thing, or person, real, or imaginary. As the chips fall before the mallet and chisel, the idea is being realized, until, finally, when the last stroke is made, the idea has become actualized, it has sprung forth a reality. With this understanding of mediation we shall now examine Kant's statement that "the beautiful object, or the purposiveness which it displays, is fit to be a mediating link between the realms of nature and freedom." First, it is observed that Kant attributes purposiveness to beautiful objects because of their fitness to arouse a pleasurable employment of the faculty of cognition in general. The principle upon which Kant bases the reference of purposiveness to the beautiful is, "that if an object or state of mind, or even an action is inexplicable except by reference to a ground of causality acting according to purpose, then we must think purpose".<sup>1</sup> When an object is contingent so far as the ordinary processes of nature are concerned we are obliged to employ the idea of design as a principle of its explanation. On this ground, the beautiful object is thought to require the employment of the idea of design as the key to its explanation. One cannot penetrate the secret of its nature without regarding it as the embodiment of an idea, or purpose. But, as we

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 67. H., V, 225. B., 68.

have seen, to find purpose in an object is the same as to find in it a union, a mediation of nature and freedom. Such an object may aptly be described as a 'concrete idea', an idea which has taken body and form, which has become tangible. The beautiful object reveals this union of freedom and nature in the fact that it contains a manifold of sense adapted to arouse the harmonious activity of Imagination and Understanding. If one goes deeper for the ground of the harmony, it is found in the fact that an idea is immanent in the beautiful object: there is a union of real and ideal. To slightly vary Bosanquet's language, "The beautiful object is assigned by Kant the high position of being the representative of reason in the world of sense, and of sense in the world of reason".<sup>1</sup>

#### § 4. EVIDENCE OF DESIGN IN ORGANIC NATURE.

It must constantly be borne in mind that the principal aim of this study is to examine the *Critique of Judgment* as a means of combining the Critiques of pure and practical Reason; or, if one is thinking of the content—the inner nature of the three Critiques—the object is to consider the principle of *purposiveness*, which the Critique of Judgment exhibits, as a principle of mediation between the modes of thought prevailing in the realms of nature and freedom. Our purpose is to consider the principle of teleology as a means of harmonizing the view that insists unyieldingly upon the universal validity and applicability of the principles of physical science and the view that claims for freedom a causality independently of the physical series.

In the first two Critiques, Kant tried to overcome this opposition by conceiving two separate worlds, or king-

<sup>1</sup> Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

doms, in one of which Science and its principles should have undisputed authority; in the other, Freedom and its legislation should have absolute dominion. This is the familiar distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, by which the principles of physical science are left in secure possession of the phenomenal world, while the practical Reason is relegated to the noumenal world. Kant's critics, however, were not disposed to allow him to lay the unction to his soul that his solution of the difficulty was adequate; and, although he valiantly came to its defense, he soon saw the need of a positive and real harmonization of the results of the earlier Critiques. That is, he came to see that the purposes of freedom must be thought as being capable of realization in nature. It must be conceivable that the ideals of practical Reason are able to find expression in the sense world.

We have seen in the preceding sections of this Part, that the purposiveness displayed by beautiful objects is thought to bridge the chasm between nature and freedom. We shall now have to consider another set of purposive phenomena which are thought to unite these two realms. Those phenomena are organisms, and they form the subject matter of the second part of the *Critique of Judgment*, the Critique of the teleological Judgment.

It is now proposed to consider the main doctrines of the last named work, omitting everything which does not contribute directly to elucidate the thesis that organisms are inexplicable *to us* unless we import the concept of purpose as a new principle of explanation. The general problem discussed in this part of the *Critique of Judgment* is, "to what extent and on what grounds can we apply the idea of objective purposiveness to



nature?" In former works, Kant had considered the grounds for regarding nature in some of its parts, or as a whole, as either *subjectively* or *formally* purposive. He had shown in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment that we have good ground for assuming that nature, in many of its products, is *subjectively* purposive with reference to the nature of our cognitive faculties. Many objects appear especially fitted for our Judgment, and "serve at once to strengthen and sustain the mental powers that come into play in the employment of this faculty."<sup>1</sup> In this respect nature is said to be *subjectively* purposive. So, also, in the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant already had vindicated the use of the concept of the *formal* purposiveness of nature as an aid in our investigation of nature. In both places he maintained, (1) that the world is an intelligible system; (2) that it is intelligible to us; (3) that we are warranted in carrying with us as a guide and impetus to the investigation of phenomena, the assumption that the world is designed with reference to the nature of our cognitive powers. In this way Kant had indicated the grounds for attributing both *subjective* and *formal* purposiveness to nature. The Beautiful leads us to think *subjective* purposiveness; the order and system of nature justifies us in regarding it as *formally* purposive. The question now is, can we apply the idea of *objective* purposiveness, to nature as a whole, or to any of its parts? In other words, do purposes constitute a particular kind of causality in the realm of organic nature?

According to his usual method, Kant divides the Critique of the teleological Judgment into an Analytic and Dialectic, with an Appendix on Methodology. The

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 239. H., V, 371. B., 259.

particular tasks undertaken in the *Analytic* are, (1) to define and illustrate the different kinds of objective purposiveness; (2) to present the evidence of design in nature; (3) to indicate the place of teleology in a theoretical natural science.

In discussing the first of these points, Kant distinguishes *formal* from *material*, objective purposiveness. Certain geometrical figures, *e. g.*, the circle, which 'display a manifold, oft-admired purposiveness with reference to their usefulness for the solution of several problems by a single principle,' are cited as examples of *formal* objective purposiveness.<sup>1</sup> They are formally, not materially purposive, because it is not supposed that the figures exist in order to fulfill the use made of them. That is, purpose is not thought to be the ground or basis of their existence. The definition of *material* objective purposiveness is implicit in the foregoing, viz., a purpose which implies that the purposiveness is designed, is dependent on a concept of purpose, *e. g.*, when one sees the plants in a garden distributed with order and regularity, one is led to suppose that the order and regularity is the result of plan. Here we have material objective purposiveness, of which there are two kinds, *relative* and *inner*. Relative, or external, purpose is seen in those objects that serve as *means* to other objects, *e. g.*, grass is a *relative* purpose with reference to the needs of certain herbivorous animals. It is purposive, not in itself, but with relation to something else. We say, on the contrary, that a thing displays *inner* purpose when it exists as an end in itself. One does not need, that is, to go outside of it to make its nature intelligible. It is a whole which contains its own explanation: it has *inner* purposiveness (*innere Zweckmässigkeit*).

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 242. H., V, 374. B., 262.

After drawing these distinctions, Kant proceeds to consider a particular class of natural products, which, at the same time, are natural purposes. These objects have three distinguishing marks. In the first place, they must be both cause and effect of themselves. This paradox is exemplified in the case of a tree that produces itself generically. Viewed from one standpoint the genus tree is continually self-produced: viewed from another, it continually produces itself. That which in one sense is the effect may also be regarded as the cause of the effect. Practical life affords numerous instances of this kind of causal connection, *e. g.*, when one lights a lamp in the evening, the idea of a possible light is the cause of lighting the lamp; the effect, or the idea of the effect, is the real cause. The remaining marks of things regarded as natural purposes are, first, that their parts shall be ordered with reference to the character of the whole; that the idea of the whole shall determine the character of all the parts. And in the second place, it is necessary that the parts should so combine in the unity of the whole as to be reciprocally cause and effect of each others form; that "every part should exist not only *by means* of the other parts, but be thought as existing *for the sake* of the others and the whole."<sup>1</sup> Thus in a tree the various parts exist by means of, and for the sake of, the other parts, as well as for the tree as a whole. "A natural purpose is, therefore, an organized and self-organizing being."<sup>2</sup> The purpose is not referred to a being outside the object, as in a work of art, but is thought to be in the object itself. To speak strictly, then, the organization of nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality we know.<sup>3</sup> The object and

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 257. H., V, 386. B., 277.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 257. H., V, 386. B., 278.

<sup>3</sup> R., IV, 258. H., V, 387. B., 279.

every part of it are conceived as being determined by the idea of the object as a whole. It follows, therefore, that we have no reason to regard the form of such a natural product as partly dependent upon mechanism and partly dependent upon purpose; *i. e.*, we must not mix mechanism and teleology in judging nature.

We are thus brought to the third important discussion of the *Analytic*; viz., the place of teleology in theoretical natural science. Kant holds that both the mechanical and teleological methods are required to interpret nature. If Reason hopes to gain an insight into the nature of things, it must not abandon the *mechanical* mode of explanation, but it is just as necessary that the *purposiveness* of nature should not be overlooked. In the first place, Kant maintains that every investigator proceeds on the assumption that the world is adapted to the use of our cognitive faculties, that is, that it is intelligible. It is a necessary assumption of reason that order and system exist amid all the manifoldness and variety of nature, or in other words, that nature embodies some intelligible purpose. "The conceived harmony of nature in the variety of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it, must be judged as contingent in respect of our insight; but yet at the same time as indispensable for the needs of our understanding; and, consequently, as a purposiveness by which nature is harmonized with our design, which has only knowledge for its aim."<sup>1</sup> That is, it is assumed that we shall be able to unite all diverse principles under one all embracing principle; that nature is a unity, and that we may continually approach the discovery of that unity in the extension of knowledge.

A special application of the general principle of the

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 26. H., V, 193. B., 26.

intelligibility of nature is made by the scientist in approaching the investigation of organic phenomena. For he proceeds upon the assumption that all the parts of an organism have a meaning with reference to all the other parts; "that nothing in such a creature is in vain." He supposes that such objects are fashioned according to a plan, and that all the parts bear an important relation to that plan. This use of design may be illustrated by taking the case of a botanist who is attracted by the curious arrangement of the parts of a particular flower. He quite naturally will ask, what is it for? *i. e.*, what is its purpose? Investigation stimulated and guided by the desire to understand the purpose or design of the peculiar arrangement of the flower parts, results in showing that it is a device to prevent close and secure cross-fertilization. Numerous examples might be given to show that some of the richest rewards of scientific inquiry are gained in the effort to explain the meaning, or purpose, of something which appears in itself to be merely unusual, or trivial, both in the inorganic and organic realms; and in faithfully following the teleological maxim that everything in nature has a meaning.

In addition to the uses of design as a regulative principle indicated by Kant, there are passages in which he seems to say that we cannot fully understand a thing until we gain an insight into its purpose, or can tell what end it serves. The account of *how* it came to be as it is, may be full and complete, and yet we may have no *real* understanding of the object. The mechanical explanation must be supplemented by the teleological.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kant has no thought, however, of abandoning the scientific mode of explanation in favor of the teleological. His employment of the notion of design is *not* the one ridiculed by Spinoza as "the retreat to the sanctuary of ignorance" when it is impossible to find scientific explanations of phenomena. For, it will be remembered, (1) that

Having presented in the foregoing paragraphs Kant's use of the notion of design in investigating organic nature, it remains to indicate the application of the doctrine of purposiveness in organisms to the problem of mediation. We have seen that Kant was led to employ the idea of design as a guiding principle in the investigation of organic phenomena because the mechanical rules of explanation do not enable us to render a full account of the form and existence of those phenomena. The harmonious relation of the parts cannot be thought except as the result of design. The idea of the whole is thought to determine the form and combination of the various parts of the organism, just as in a work of art, the idea of the work as a whole determines the special features and parts of the production. Moreover in the organism, an Idea is taken as the ground of the form and existence of the object. An object whose parts stand in organic relation furnishes an instance of the union of purpose and sensuous matter, of idea and reality. Now since the realm of nature is also the realm of the material, and the realm of freedom corresponds to the realm of purposes, we are enabled to see that in the organism we have a union of freedom and nature. In an organism we have an example of purposiveness, or freedom, revealing itself in the material, sense-world.

the idea of design which Kant employs is that of natural, or *immanent* purpose in the organism itself, and that there is no necessary reference to an external will; and (2), that the idea of purposiveness in its regulative use contributes directly towards the discovery of natural causes. Furthermore, (3) one may say that this idea *completes* the scientific explanation by showing the real unity and intelligibility of the facts which the latter presents. It is both the author and finisher of the scientific mode of explanation.

§ 5. RELATION OF TELEOLOGY TO KANT'S ETHICAL  
DOCTRINES.

The two preceding sections were concerned chiefly in developing and illustrating the thought which is implicit in Kant's phrase that, 'purposiveness is fit to be a mediating link between the realms of nature and freedom.' Preliminary to that discussion, a section was given to the representation of the nature of the opposition between these two realms. Before we could understand what mediation meant, and what it involved, it was necessary to determine the nature of the opposites which were to be mediated. It was seen that the antagonism is between the mode of thought which regards every event in the order of nature as the result of purely physical forces, and the mode of thought which claims for Reason a causality through freedom.

The effort to harmonize, or reconcile, these opposing modes of thought formed an important, if not the most important part of the Critical philosophy. Abundant evidence could be adduced to support the thesis that Kant's paramount purpose throughout the entire course of his reflection was to reconcile the doctrines of freedom and necessity, to harmonize the teleological and mechanical conceptions of the world. One may distinguish three steps, or stages, in Kant's treatment of this problem. The first is that presented in the solution of the third Antinomy, and is usually referred to as the solution by the doctrine of the ideality of phenomena, or by the distinction of phenomena and noumena. Kant in these pages reminds us that the transcendental analytic of pure Reason firmly established the correctness of the doctrine, that all events in the phenomenal world have an unbroken connection according to unchangeable

laws ; that therefore, the only question open is ' whether it is a proper disjunctive proposition to say, that every effect in the world must arise, *either* from nature *or* from freedom, or whether both cannot co-exist in the same event in different relations.<sup>1</sup> Does causality by nature exclude the possibility of causality by freedom ? May not freedom and nature unite in producing the same effect ? Kant's answer is that if you insist upon the reality of phenomena, freedom is lost, because, in the world of phenomena, events have an unbroken connection according to the unalterable law of natural necessity. But by ascribing both an empirical and an intelligible character to every subject of the sense-world, one may think freedom though it cannot thereby be established. In its empirical character every subject, as a phenomenon, would stand with other phenomena in an unbroken connection according to fixed laws of nature, and all its actions would be determined by those laws. But in its *intelligible* character it would be quite free from every external influence and would have a causality of its own. In this way we are enabled to think the possibility of both nature and freedom existing together in the same action. Man, like every object in the sense-world, can be viewed from these two points of view. In his empirical character he is under the laws of physical necessity ; but in his intelligible character he is free and determines himself in accordance with the laws of Reason. Kant concludes that the laws of nature and the law of freedom are not contradictory ; but he does not claim to have established the *reality*, or even the *possibility* of freedom, but merely that nature regarded as a phenomenon does not necessarily contradict or exclude the causality of freedom.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R., II, 421. H., III, 372 f. M., II, 463.

<sup>2</sup> R., II, 437. H., III, 385. M., II, 481.



The second step in Kant's solution of the problem of freedom and necessity is the argument for freedom based upon the consciousness of duty. The sense of obligation imposed by the moral law implies the power to fulfill that obligation; it is evidence of freedom. We *ought*, therefore, we *can*. The first step was to show that freedom is not incompatible with physical law; that one can, without doing violence to Reason, think a union of both freedom and natural necessity in the same action. The second step was to affirm the fact of freedom upon the ground of duty. But both of these modes of proof were far from satisfactory, since they give us no assurance that the ideas of freedom ever become realized in the world. They furnished no evidence that the ideas of freedom ever find expression or realization in the sense-world. It was sufficient to satisfy the demand of the moral law if one was conscious of willing in accordance with that law.

Now one can easily understand why Kant could not rest content with such a notion of freedom. For the latter is a worthless treasure, if its purposes are incapable of realization in the phenomenal world. It would be mockery to endow man with the power of free causality and yet confess that he can never know that he actually does exert an influence upon the course of events. That is, if there is an impassable gulf between nature and freedom so that the latter can exert no influence upon the former—if freedom is impotent to fulfill its ideals—then it is useless and not worth the labor it costs to defend it. Accordingly, in the last Critique, Kant drops a hint as to the way in which the idea of freedom may be brought into connection with the doctrine of physical necessity, viz., through the idea of purposiveness which the Beautiful and the Organic exhibit. It has already been ex-

plained how the Beautiful and the Organic, through the design which they display, may be regarded as examples of a blending of nature and freedom, how in each of those classes of objects there is both a sensuous, material element, and also a spiritual or ideal element. Kant further explains that the Reflective Judgment, in pronouncing certain objects purposive, thereby declares that concepts of freedom are realized in the realm of nature ; and this declaration is made irrespective of practical considerations, *i. e.*, without reference to the possibility of realizing the purposes of the practical Reason. Yet, as will be shown presently, the main use which Kant sought to make of the doctrine of purposiveness, and the evidences of purpose which he discovered in nature, was to strengthen the foundations of his ethical doctrines, especially the doctrine of Freedom. If one raises again the question why Kant was so desirous of bringing into closer relation the leading doctrines of the critiques of pure and practical Reason, why he deemed it so important to mediate the concepts dominating the realms of nature and freedom, the answer is, as anticipated above, that by so doing he hoped to strengthen the ethical doctrines advanced in the earlier Critiques.

For as every student of the critical philosophy soon comes to feel, Kant regarded the interests of the practical Reason as of transcendent importance. The one thing of absolute worth in all the world is man acting under the moral law. Kant's scientific spirit, his intense love of truth, will win the admiration of all succeeding ages ; but stronger than his devotion to truth, for truth's sake, was his devotion to the interests of man as a moral being. Accordingly, when the question of the final purpose of nature is raised, when it is asked, What meaning has nature, what is its *raison d'être* and ultimate pur-

pose, Kant replies that it is only with reference to man's moral nature that the world has a meaning. It is clear that this is in accord with the note struck in the opening sentence of the *Metaphysic of Morals*: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will;"<sup>1</sup> and by 'good will' Kant means a Will under the moral law. It is in man as a moral being, man possessed of a good will, then, that Kant finds a being of absolute worth, and one that gives meaning and purpose to the world. "Without man the whole creation would be a mere waste, in vain, and without final purpose; and it is in man's good will that he can have an absolute worth, and in reference to which the world can have a final purpose."<sup>2</sup>

It is to be noted further that the world is conceived as a sort of training place for man's moral nature; a scene of probation in which he is prepared for a nobler and more blessed state hereafter. The hardships, oppression and cruelty which man suffers from the world help to free him from the fetters of desire and prepare him for the exercise of his nobler faculties. It is as a means of discipline to man's moral nature that the world has a meaning.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Abbott, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 342 f. H., V, 455, f. B., 370, f.

<sup>3</sup> It is interesting to notice the striking similarity between the views of Kant and Fichte concerning nature and its purpose with reference to the development of man's moral character. Although Fichte's thought is expressed in quite different language and is not so explicit as Kant's statement, yet his view is substantially a repetition of the doctrine of Kant, that the world has its final explanation in serving as a means of culture to the moral side of man's nature. In the *theoretical* part of the *Science of Knowledge*, Fichte showed that if the Ego is to be intelligence, part of its infinitely extending activity must be canceled, and thus posited in its opposite, the non-ego. In the *practical* part, it is shown that if the Ego is to be Will, if it is to have

Now when we remember the great importance which Kant attached to the moral element in man's nature, we may understand why he was so much concerned to render secure the interests and position of the practical Reason. Every fact and every argument that could be used to strengthen the postulates of morals would be brought into service. We may suppose, therefore, that it was Kant's purpose to use the results of the *Critique of*

a causality, it must encounter resistance and opposition in the non-ego. As practical, the Ego yearns to change the order of the world, to make it conform to its own ideal activity. In other words—and this is the point with which we are here concerned—the purpose, or function, of nature with reference to man's moral character, is to offer resistance to the infinite activity of the Ego; first, in order that consciousness and intelligence may be aroused; second, in order that moral ideals may be conceived as a result of the check put upon the Ego's activity.

It is of interest to note, also, that this view of nature and its purpose with reference to the conditions of realizing the *summum bonum*, differs from the view presented in the corresponding discussions of the earlier critiques. The *summum bonum* for Kant consists of two factors, perfect holiness and perfect happiness. Now perfect happiness depends upon the harmony of physical nature with man's moral activity. Kant, however, maintained in the first two critiques that this harmony is wanting, that nature is a hindrance to the realization of happiness. The world, thus regarded, is a bar to the actualization of one factor of the *summum bonum*. But when Kant comes to search for the final purpose of nature, and its function with reference to that purpose, he is led to regard nature as an indispensable means to the culture of man's moral powers. The obstacles, cruelties, and hardships which oppress man upon every side are disguised blessings, but nevertheless blessings, because they help him to free himself from the tyranny of sense and enable him to rise to the clear atmosphere of pure Reason. According to the one view, the world presents an insuperable obstacle to happiness so far as man's power is concerned. According to the other, the world is a necessary means of culture to man's moral nature. The contradiction inherent in the two views is irreconcilable. For so long as the world is useful as a means of culture to man's *virtue*, it is an obstacle the realization of his *happiness*; and when it is brought into harmony with the conditions of happiness, it loses its value as a means of moral culture. It thus appears that it is impossible to attain both happiness and holiness at the same time. The conditions favorable to the realization of the one are unfavorable to the realization of the other.

*Judgment* as a confirmation of the postulates of practical Reason, especially the postulates of God and freedom. We shall now have to see how the principles established in the third Critique strengthen Kant's ethical doctrines. First, with reference to the notion of freedom, it is clear that if there is evidence that some causes, or forces, besides physical causes are at work or have been at work in nature, and if there is ground for supposing that those forces are analogous to our human reason, we are warranted in assuming that our own will may find its ideals realized in the realm of nature. It has been explained already that to regard a thing as purposive is the same as to see in it the work of freedom. Moreover, when Kant speaks of mediating the realms of nature and freedom he is thinking of the possibility of realizing *moral* concepts in the material world. This does not mean merely that one can carry out the rules of skill and art, that we can fashion the material world according to plans: the mediation of nature and freedom to which he refers is the harmonization of nature and moral purposes. When Kant speaks of mediating nature and that which the concept of freedom *practically* contains, it is evident that he has in mind *moral* freedom and its concepts. All doubt as to whether Kant is thinking of moral purposes is removed when we recall the distinction drawn between *technically* practical and *morally* practical principles of the Will. He says, "the Will . . . is one of the many natural causes in the world, viz., that cause which acts in accordance with concepts. All that is represented as possible by means of a will is called *practically* possible. Now if the concept which determines the causality of the Will is a *natural concept*, then the principles are *technically practical*; but if it is a concept of freedom, they are *morally practical*."

The rules of skill and art rest upon *natural concepts*; but the rules of morals are based upon *concepts of freedom*—the moral law.”<sup>1</sup> Therefore, when Kant speaks of the ‘concepts of freedom,’ he invariably has reference to the determination of the Will according to moral ideals, and when he speaks of mediating nature and freedom, he refers to the realization of a moral idea in nature. Further, he expressly states that “purposes in the world are studied in order to confirm incidentally the Ideas that pure practical Reason furnishes;”<sup>2</sup> those Ideas, I take it, are the ideas of God and Freedom. Again, when Kant states in the Preface to the *Critique of Judgment* that the *a priori* concept of purposiveness opens out prospects which are advantageous for the practical Reason,”<sup>3</sup> he doubtless refers to the use one can make of that notion to strengthen the grounds of belief in God and Freedom. In a word, Kant would use the evidence of purposiveness exhibited by nature as a means of fortifying the conviction that other forces than physical forces exert an influence upon the course of the world.

Not only does the doctrine of purposiveness in nature lend itself to the service of Kant's theory of Freedom, but the doctrine of the *summum bonum* is also indirectly strengthened thereby. It will be remembered that Kant postulated an eternity of existence (immortality) in which to attain to perfect virtue, the first and fundamental factor of *summum bonum*. Now perfect virtue must be accompanied by perfect happiness, which is defined as “the state of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will,

<sup>1</sup> R., IV, 9. H., V, 178. B., 7.

<sup>2</sup> R., IV, 345. H., V, 358. B., 373.

<sup>3</sup> R., IV, 6. H., V, 176. B., 4.

and rests, therefore, upon the harmony of physical nature with his whole end and with the essential determining principles of his will."<sup>1</sup> But since man is not the cause of nature, and therefore is not able to make it harmonize with his practical needs, we must postulate the existence of a Power great enough to bring the world into accord with man's moral nature. We assume the existence of a being distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of connection between happiness and goodness.<sup>2</sup> That Being is God, and any evidence tending to prove his existence will indirectly support the doctrine of the *summum bonum*. For, as was just stated, it is only upon the supposition of the existence of God, that we have a guarantee of that due proportion between virtue and happiness which constitutes the *summum bonum*.

Now the argument for the existence of God derived from "the order, variety, fitness, beauty," which the world presents, is, in Kant's language, "the oldest, the clearest and the most in conformity with human reason"; and although he maintained throughout all his writings that "the moral proof is the only one that produces conviction," yet the physico-teleological proof has the merit of leading the mind in its consideration of the world by the way of purposes and through them to an intelligible author of the world. The physico-teleological proof by leading the mind to consider the wisdom and beauty of the world, and, so, to think a causality according to purposes, makes the mind more susceptible to the moral argument. "The argument from design mingles itself with the moral argument and serves as a desirable confirmation of the latter."

<sup>1</sup> Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> R., VIII, 265. H., V, 130 f. Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 221 f.

The present section may be summed up by repeating that the notion of design suggested by the Beautiful and the Organic points to and is evidence of a force or principle in nature over and above physical forces. There is evidence of the work of purpose in nature; an idea is thought to be immanent in certain of its products. Now if this belief is well grounded, we are encouraged to hope that our ideas, or purposes, may find expression in the natural world; in short, that man through freedom, may actualize the demands of the practical Reason. In the second place, the evidence of design in nature helps to strengthen the argument for the existence of God—a necessary condition of the realization of the *summum bonum*.

In discussing the meaning and function of the principle of teleology, no special notice has been taken of the fact that Kant maintained to the last that the latter has merely subjective validity, and is valuable only as a methodological principle of investigation; that he never tires of warning his reader against the dangers involved in the attempt to give that principle objective applications. Justification for this mode of procedure may, I think, be found in the fact that Kant himself, despite his repeated warnings, applies the teleological principle with as much confidence, apparently, as if he believed it to possess objective validity. Moreover, we are justified in passing over lightly Kant's protests, because the notion of design, if reduced to a merely regulative principle, loses its meaning and efficacy as a means of mediating the concepts of freedom and nature. For, if we conclude that after all there is no purpose, no design in nature, then the great structure built up in the *Critique of Judgment* on the unwarranted assumption of purposive-



ness in nature, is like a house built upon the sand. It has been assumed, throughout this thesis, therefore, that Kant would have given teleology a place among the determinant concepts of the understanding, if he had not been bound by the supposed finality and completeness of the table of categories drawn up in the first Critique. Kant, following the cue he had taken from formal logic, supposed that he had found a complete list of the possible ways in which the pure understanding manifests itself in the complex of experience. He could not admit a new category without disturbing the table already established; and, what was more serious than the mere interference with the formal symmetry of his scheme, the admission of a new category would have necessitated a reconstruction of his theory of knowledge. It is more than probable, therefore, that Kant would have clothed teleology with the power of objective determination if he had not been limited by the theory of knowledge worked out in the first Critique. For its objective validity can apparently be justified by appealing to the principle employed by Kant as a guide in the deduction of the categories. That principle is that, "it is really a sufficient deduction of the categories and a justification of their objective validity, if we succeed in proving that by them alone, an object can be thought."<sup>1</sup> That is, a category is a necessary postulate of knowledge, its validity is sufficiently guaranteed, if it can be shown that it is required and presupposed in our actual experience. Now, we ask, cannot the principle of purposiveness be given a place among the categories upon this ground? If it is true, as Kant holds, that the mechanical explanation of the world leaves our knowledge incomplete; if it is true that we cannot fully understand nature or any of its parts until we have an insight

<sup>1</sup> R., 92 H., 566. M., II, 86.

into its meaning and purpose, what justification can be found for stopping short of the teleological explanation of the world? It is true that teleology does not seem as fundamental to the very *existence* of experience as some of the other categories. We can have an experience of objects—an experience too which has *some degree* of unity and coherence—without the notion of purpose. But as Kant has said, our experience can never be a *real* unity without this idea. It is necessary to satisfy our demand for complete explanation, and to make the world fully intelligible. And this being so, teleology it seems to me to be proved or justified in exactly the same way as the principle of causality. Moreover, it might be urged—and this argument would have much weight from Kant's standpoint—that the validity of the teleological view of the world is a necessary requirement of morals and religion. The conception of the world as flowing from and guided by a Divine purpose is fundamental to the moral and religious life. "That is, it is necessary to assume a morally-legislating Being outside the world from purely moral grounds on the mere recommendation of a purely practical Reason legislating by itself alone. . . . We must assume a moral World-Cause in order to set before ourselves a final purpose consistently with the moral law."





















